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COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE AND THE DUTCH HORIZONTAL 
MONITORING MODEL 
 





Cooperative compliance can be defined as the establishment of a trust-based cooperative 
relationship between taxpayers and the tax authorities on the basis of voluntary tax compliance 
leading to the payment of the right amount of tax at the right time. The Dutch Horizontal 
Monitoring (HM) model can be defined as a means of administrative supervision based on 
(informed) trust, mutual understanding and transparency between individual taxpayers and the 
Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration (NTCA). The authors elaborate on the principles 
of reciprocal trust, understanding and transparency. Subsequently, they assess the trust-based 
Horizontal Monitoring relationship and its establishment in the light of the principles of 
reciprocal trust, understanding and transparency. Furthermore, they evaluate these aspects of 
the Horizontal Monitoring model in the light of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development’s (OECD’s) principles of a cooperative compliance model. First, the ensuing 
obligations are classified with a view to the reciprocal nature of this set of obligations. 
Secondly, these obligations are differentiated with respect to their statutory versus voluntary 
and extra-statutory nature. The research shows that the Horizontal Monitoring model fits into 
the OECD’s concept of cooperative compliance. A striking difference between the two models 
is that the OECD model mainly - but not only - addresses the obligations of the tax authorities. 
The Dutch model, however, creates obligations of a more reciprocal nature between tax 
authorities and taxpayers. Both models, however, aim to increase trust in the tax authorities 
and build a service climate in order to promote voluntary compliance. Changing views on tax 
enforcement, tax compliance and tax planning require continual reflection on further 
improvement of both the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model and the general concept of 
cooperative tax compliance. 
 
Keywords: Cooperative compliance, Dutch Horizontal Monitoring, (informed) trust, mutual 
understanding and transparency, extra-statutory obligations  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2005, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) launched an 
investigation into recent developments in the Netherlands, Ireland and the United States with 
regard to tax administrations’ risk management and compliance strategies. According to the 
OECD, the rapidly evolving social environment in which tax authorities operate leaves room 
for (aggressive) tax-saving structures (OECD, 2007e). Within the letter of the law, companies 
explore tax-saving opportunities which the legislator would have prevented if he had foreseen 
them. International concern about the use of tax-saving structures and the aim to develop 
solutions by which to improve the relationships between tax authorities, taxpayers, and 
                                                 
1Assistant Professor of Tax Law, Institute of Tax Law and Economics, Leiden University, 
e.a.m.huiskers@law.leidenuniv.nl. 
2 Professor of Tax Law, Fiscal Institute and the Center for Company Law, Tilburg University; Professor of Tax 
Law, Leiden University; j.l.m.gribnau@tilburguniversity.edu. 
3 The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on a previous draft of this 
paper. 
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 5:1 2019                                          Cooperative Compliance and the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring Model 
67 
 
financial and tax law specialists caused the OECD to decide to investigate their mutual 
relationships (OECD, 2008, p. 7; see also OECD, 2007c, p. 2).  
 
Three years and six working papers later, the OECD published its 2008 report on “Enhanced 
Relationships”. In 2013, the OECD delivered the results of follow-up research: “From 
Enhanced Relationships to Cooperative Compliance”. In the report(s), the OECD developed 
the so-called cooperative compliance or Horizontal Monitoring (HM) model for relationships 
between companies and the tax authorities. Under this model, it is important that taxpayers: 1) 
agree to voluntary tax compliance; 2) establish a cooperation with the tax authorities; and 3) 
are willing to work together with the tax authorities in a framework based on trust. Research 
into advancing technological developments and the need to also engage smaller companies in 
tax compliance improvement resulted in the OECD releasing a further report in 2014: “Tax 
Compliance by Design”. In this report, the OECD developed a model based on various 
monitoring strategies fine-tuned to suit the specific features of a country, a tax administration, 
certain taxpayers, or business activities with the aim of obtaining tax-relevant information from 
third parties (OECD, 2014, p. 40). In 2016, the OECD released its report “Building Better Tax 
Control Frameworks” (OECD, 2016). This report provides guidance on the quality of a Tax 
Control Framework (TCF) to manage tax control for (large) companies and tax authorities 
participating in a cooperative compliance relationship. 
 
The Netherlands participates in the OECD’s policy formation work. The team that prepared 
the “Study into the Role of Tax Intermediaries” worked closely with a core group of countries, 
including The Netherlands, that acted as a steering group for the work, and representatives of 
the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration (NTCA) participated in a mid-term review 
(OECD, 2008, p. 3). The Netherlands was also a member of a task group that prepared the 2014 
report “Tax Compliance by Design” (OECD, 2014, p. 3). In 2014, the Netherlands hosted a 
meeting of delegates from the tax authorities of several OECD countries “in order to further 
develop the TCF” (OECD, 2016, p. 10). This participation influenced the various reports. The 
influence of the Netherlands on the 2013 OECD report is, for example, “reflected in the 
emphasis on tax control frameworks which form the backbone of the version of cooperative 
compliance adopted by NTCA” (De Widt & Oats, 2018, p. 262). It is, therefore, difficult to 
draw a clear line between the OECD approach and the Dutch approach, since the Netherlands 
was a driver of the OECD approach.  
 
In 2005, the Netherlands introduced the possibility for companies to enter into Horizontal 
Monitoring relationships with the NTCA. The model can be defined as a means of 
administrative supervision based on mutual (informed) trust, mutual understanding and 
transparency between individual taxpayers and the NTCA (Huiskers-Stoop & Diekman, 2012a, 
p. 231). In exchange for providing relevant tax information on a voluntary basis, taxpayers 
obtain fiscal certainty about their tax liability in advance and are – in principle – no longer 
subject to time and effort-consuming tax audits, sanctions and prosecution afterwards 
(Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, p. 439). Of course, random checks and audits can be carried out by the 
tax inspectors. 
 
It goes without saying that parties do not trust each other blindly. They depend on information 
in order to assess each other’s trustworthiness. Informed trust depends on reciprocal 
transparency with regard to information provided by the tax authorities and taxpayer. How does 
the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model work in practice, how can the NTCA be sure that it is 
sufficiently well-informed and does this model relate to the OECD’s concept of cooperative 
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compliance? These questions will be answered in this paper. We will first give a brief overview 
of the model, and then put forward and elucidate our research question and method. 
 
1.1  The Horizontal Monitoring model   
 
In the 1990s, the NTCA introduced its risk assessment strategy, allocating the available scarce 
resources to high taxpayer service and high-risk areas. Intervention was deemed necessary only 
in the event of an actual risk. As a result, each taxpayer category should get the appropriate 
attention. Just before the turn of the millennium, the NTCA introduced its compliance strategy 
in order to support and strengthen the willingness of taxpayers to observe their statutory 
obligations. In 2005, a new kind of arrangement with multinationals was included in this 
compliance strategy: Horizontal Monitoring (for the factors that incentivised the Dutch tax 
authorities to experiment with a different type of monitoring, see De Widt, 2017, pp. 8-10).    
 
The Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model has no specific statutory basis. That being said, the 
NTCA is allowed, under Dutch law, to organise the enforcement process at its discretion and 
may (and even should) develop policies for the use of this discretion (Gribnau, 2015a, pp. 194-
195; Happé & Pauwels, 2011, p. 228;). Legal and constitutional theories may be helpful “in 
order to articulate concrete standards for the exercise of discretion” (de Cogan, 2011, p. 6). It 
is widely recognised that tax authorities have discretion that “permits an administrator to 
engage in settlements and tax amnesties, apply ambiguous and impractical laws in a fair and 
sensible way, and generally to exercise common sense where the legislation is deficient” 
(Dabner & Burton, 2009, p. 325; Dabner, 2012, p. 541, p. 546). The UK Commissioners for 
Revenue and Customs Act 2005 vests HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) with such general 
discretionary power to undertake acts in relation to their responsibility for the “collection and 
management” of taxes and gives HMRC the power to “do anything which they think (a) 
necessary or expedient in connection with the exercise of their functions, or (b) incidental or 
conducive to the exercise of their functions” (Freedman & Vella, 2011, pp. 80-81). Discretion 
with regard to the enforcement process can be defined as the “elbow room” that the NTCA has 
to efficiently set up the taxation process in view of scarce enforcement resources and the 
different characteristics and risk profiles of taxpayers. Horizontal Monitoring is an enforcement 
strategy developed on the basis of this discretion (see also Bronzewska, 2016, pp. 357-364). In 
this respect, deploying scarce enforcement resources as efficiently and effectively as possible 
is an important consideration. The NTCA is free – within the framework of tax law – to apply 
supervision flexibly and to customise its approach towards taxpayers. There is a twofold check 
on this supervision: tax assessments and other legal decisions are subject to review by the 
courts, and the State Secretary of Finance is politically accountable to the Dutch Parliament. 
 
Monitoring is all about assessing facts and their legal interpretation with regard to a possible 
tax liability. These facts and taxpayers’ interpretations thereof are presented in the form of tax 
returns. The Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model transferred the NTCA’s review process from 
carrying out checks after tax returns have been filed to monitoring taxpayers’ internal 
procedures preceding the filing of their tax returns. The focus thus shifts from the tax return, 
which contains positions based on actions taken by the taxpayer, to the beginning of the 
process, so before the taxpayer has even performed so-called tax-relevant actions. The 
individual compliance agreement states that tax-relevant actions apply to matters on which a 
difference of opinion may arise with NTCA; for instance, where there is a different 
interpretation of facts or matters of law (for the text of the standard covenant, see 
www.belastingdienst.nl – search for “individual compliance agreement” – or see this paper’s 
Appendix). The use of an interactive process between taxpayers and the NTCA ensures that 
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parties can discover their tax position faster, as it provides actual certainty with regard to tax 
decisions to be taken. The attention of both parties is focussed on the control of tax risks and 
the avoidance of errors, rather than on subsequent tax audits, sanctions and prosecution. As tax 
risks are discussed in advance and the taxpayer is open about his tax strategy, the tax return 
may be expected to contain no information unknown to the NTCA. Hence, the review of the 
tax return is usually a formality and a prompt imposition of the tax assessment may follow 
(NTCA, 2013, pp. 40-45). Nonetheless, companies in Horizontal Monitoring relationships can 
also be subject to tax return audits, although the frequency at which their tax returns are 
reviewed is substantially lower than that of companies which are not governed by Horizontal 
Monitoring (NTCA, 2013, p. 41). 
 
In order to qualify for a Horizontal Monitoring relationship, taxpayers must be willing and able 
to comply with the tax laws and regulations (NTCA, 2013, p. 17). In addition, taxpayers and 
the NTCA go through a seven-step process to assess whether Horizontal Monitoring is feasible. 
Both the tax administration and the taxpayer can take the initiative to explore Horizontal 
Monitoring. The process starts with the NTCA gathering information about the relevant 
company and ends with an adjustment of supervision. Should parties subsequently decide to 
enter into a Horizontal Monitoring relationship, they confirm this by signing a compliance 
agreement (covenant; see Appendix). A taxpayer is free to choose whether or not to enter into 
Horizontal Monitoring; there is no legal obligation to do so. However, the NTCA might reject 
the taxpayer’s request. This might happen if the NTCA has insufficient confidence in the 
taxpayer’s tax strategy, its internal tax control system or its transparency on submission of 
relevant tax matters. The taxpayer will probably not, therefore, complete several of the steps 
preceding the conclusion of a Horizontal Monitoring covenant successfully (NTCA, 2013, p. 
6; see section. 3.2). It goes without saying that most companies that do not meet these 
conditions will not apply for Horizontal Monitoring relationships. Thus, these steps (each with 
specific requirements), set out in published guidance, enable self-selection to take place among 
Horizontal Monitoring “candidates.” 
  
The covenant contains principles which stipulate that parties will work together on the basis of 
trust, mutual understanding and transparency. The covenant applies to the levying of all Dutch 
national taxes and the collection thereof. The agreement aims to realise customised tax 
monitoring, actual tax collection, actual insight into the taxpayer’s tax position and a regular 
update of the tax compliance process (in other words, “real-time working” for both parties; see 
Section 3.3). 
 
It is important to note that the covenant concerns the process (the working relationship) 
resulting in a tax liability and not the amount of tax to be paid. In this respect, we note that 
Horizontal Monitoring should not be confused with the Dutch ruling practice, under which 
advance agreements can be made about the position of the NTCA on international tax structures 
(e.g. international holding and financing activities). Bronzewska (2016) argues that a ruling 
practice is evidence of an advanced relationship between taxpayers and tax authorities, and is 
one step ahead of a minimalistic relationship which lacks a kind of communication and 
dialogue (pp. 65-68). In this sense, Horizontal Monitoring is one step ahead of a practice of 
communication and dialogue limited to providing taxpayers with certainty – for example, in 
the form of rulings. Horizontal Monitoring deals with the way in which parties cooperate in the 
taxation process – the process from the completion of possible tax-relevant transactions up to 
the filing of the tax return and issuing of the tax assessment – and not with the amount of the 
tax liability. Empirical research shows that companies with HM covenants in place perceive 
that they have better working relationships with the NTCA (NTCA, 2017). 
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Furthermore, Horizontal Monitoring fits in with the political trend for more self-responsibility, 
i.e. for citizens and companies who are willing and able to do so to take responsibility for their 
tax affairs; the idea of the “participation society” has become commonplace, both in tax matters 
and more widely (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, p. 437). Thus, Horizontal Monitoring symbolises a 
kind of “horizontalisation” of the tax relationship – cooperation on a more equal footing than 
in the traditional command and control model (Gribnau, 2015b, p. 208). Furthermore, 
Horizontal Monitoring implies a form of de-juridification, focussing on informal interaction 
between tax administration and taxpayers with an eye to shared interests, rather than on formal 
interaction which is primarily guided by legal norms and procedures (Gribnau, 2015a, p. 184, 
p. 190). Horizontal Monitoring also fits into the trend in academic theory towards the 
government’s interactive and responsive dealing with citizens. Empirical research shows that 
customised monitoring is more responsive to the needs and expectations of (corporate) citizens, 
creates more support and ensures better compliance (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, pp. 337-354, pp. 
381-384). Moreover, the voluntary character of the HM relationship provides a clear incentive 
for corporate taxpayers “to improve their internal tax control mechanisms, giving them greater 
control over their tax affairs and facilitating trust by the tax authorities” (De Widt & Oats, 
2018, p. 273). Horizontal Monitoring also fits in with the international social trend in which 
regulatory compliance, rather than non-compliant behaviour, is increasingly the norm; it is in 
this sense that tax morality increasingly gains support. 
 
Horizontal Monitoring is not “a standalone” model, as the NTCA uses the classical command 
and control regulation in respect of non-compliant taxpayers. Horizontal Monitoring is only 
one of the approaches available in the NTCA’s strategy toolkit. The NTCA does not abandon 
traditional enforcement mechanisms (vertical supervision) but puts them on hold when dealing 
with compliant taxpayers who engage in Horizontal Monitoring. Enforcement of tax law cannot 
take place without a measure of deterrence – even in the background – after all (Shaw, Slemrod 
& Whiting, 2010, pp. 1115-1118). Even trustworthy tax authorities have a need for some 
measure of power, by way of audits and sanctions, in order to enforce compliance (Kirchler, 
2007, pp. 203-205) – and rightly so, because not enforcing the law in cases where taxpayers 
are not compliant would be at the expense of the equal treatment of taxpayers and their trust in 
the NTCA. The NTCA has extensive powers under public law and can, when necessary, force 
taxpayers to submit relevant tax information so that it can assess them: e.g. Article 47 and, 
further, the General Taxes Act 1959 (Algemene Wet inzake Rijksbelastingen 1959; GTA). 
These powers compensate for the information asymmetry between the NTCA and taxpayers. 
The NTCA may request tax information, start an audit or – in cases where it suspects a criminal 
offence has taken place – enable the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (FIOD), its 
investigative service which focusses on the detection of (serious) fiscal offenses, to confiscate 
data. These powers make legal asymmetry an important feature of the relationship between the 
NTCA and taxpayers. Horizontal Monitoring aims to create a more horizontal, trust-based 
relationship against the background of legal asymmetry – which, in itself, enables the NTCA 
to fall back on vertical supervision (Gribnau, 2015a, pp. 201-204). Horizontal Monitoring is 
one of the NTCA’s compliance-enhancing tools which uses behavioural insights to promote 
voluntary compliance (Boer & Gribnau, 2018). Thus, the NTCA, like other tax authorities, 
increasingly relies on the voluntary compliance of taxpayers in the context of the use of self-
assessment systems, withholding taxes and third-party information reporting. The NTCA’s 
extensive powers to collect information in order to check tax assessments are still increasing. 
Tax authorities in the European Union (EU) cooperate to combat tax fraud and tax evasion (see 
Council Directive 2011/16/EU). Recently, reporting mechanisms have also been introduced in 
the fight against tax evasion and aggressive tax planning. Directive 2011/16/EU was recast to 
enable the (mandatory) automatic exchange of information on rulings (Directive 
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2015/2376/EU). The directive was subsequently reamended to provide for country-by-country 
reporting (Directive 2016/881/EU; see Seer & Wilms, 2016). Due to the increased international 
exchange of information among tax authorities and the disclosure obligations of taxpayers, the 
amount of information available to tax authorities which can enable them to enforce their tax 
laws effectively is growing dramatically. The OECD/G20’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) project is another driver (OECD, 2016, p. 12). BEPS Action 12 goes quite far in this 
respect, providing recommendations regarding the design of mandatory disclosure regimes for 
aggressive or abusive transactions, arrangements or structures. The EU took a significant step 
forward by introducing the directive on mandatory disclosure of potentially aggressive tax 
arrangements and the automatic exchange among member states of information about this kind 
of cross-border arrangement (Directive 2018/822/EU; see Cachia, 2018). 
 
1.2  Research question and method 
 
This paper studies the way in which the Netherlands incorporated the concept of cooperative 
compliance in its taxation process, and contributes to the further development of compliance 
strategies and their functioning in practice. More specifically, the different steps to be taken in 
order to enter into an HM relationship are discussed so as to gain a better understanding of the 
operationalisation of the underlying concept of a trust-based relationship, and the HM covenant 
is analysed. The covenant entails a number of obligations, based on trust, mutual understanding 
and transparency, in order to provide real-time certainty with regard to tax affairs. The analysis 
of the covenant proceeds in two steps. First, the ensuing obligations are classified with a view 
to the reciprocal nature of this set of obligations. Secondly, these obligations are differentiated 
with respect to their statutory versus voluntary and extra-statutory nature. Moreover, it 
evaluates the establishment and content of the standard Horizontal Monitoring covenant against 
the principles of the OECD concept of a cooperative compliance approach. The principal 
research question is: 
 
“How does the trust-based Horizontal Monitoring relationship and its 
establishment relate to the OECD’s model of cooperative compliance?”  
 
The paper deals with the following questions: how is the OECD’s cooperative compliance 
model defined (Section 2); what are the different steps that need to be taken in the process of 
concluding a Horizontal Monitoring covenant and how do the voluntarily accepted Horizontal 
Monitoring covenant obligations relate to the mandatory obligations laid down in the Dutch 
legal tax system (Section 3); and does the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model deliver on the 
principles of the OECD ‘s cooperative compliance model (with special attention being given 
to some issues of concern as voiced by the OECD) (Section 4)? 
 
This research mainly focusses on the establishment of, and the cooperative tax relationship 
based on, a Horizontal Monitoring covenant, in order to set out some typical aspects of the 
Dutch approach and evaluate it against the OECD’s cooperative compliance principles. To 
answer the research question, we restrict ourselves to direct Horizontal Monitoring 
relationships as entered into by the NTCA and large and medium-sized companies (turnover 
exceeds about twelve million euros, assets about six million euros and staff fifty; see Articles 
2:396-397 Dutch Civil Code and NTCA, 2014, p. 34). The NTCA does not limit Horizontal 
Monitoring relationships to large and medium-sized companies, but is also willing to enter into 
such relationships with small companies (and high net worth individuals), albeit indirectly, 
since these small companies do not have qualifying TCFs. This indirect HM relationship is 
mediated through financial or tax law specialists who monitor their clients’ control mechanisms 
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(NTCA, 2011; see Herrijgers, 2015, and Committee Horizontal Monitoring Tax and Customs 
Administration (hereinafter: Stevens Committee), 2012a, pp. 37-40). These indirect HM 
relationships fall outside the scope of this paper - apart from an isolated observation. 
 
In respect of the description of the cooperative compliance model, we map shifting approaches 
in the developing OECD vision and use public reports with regard to “Enhanced Relationships, 
Cooperative Compliance” and “Building Better Tax Control Frameworks”. For the 
specification of the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model, we use traditional legal sources, such 
as (tax) statutes and regulations, parliamentary history, published tax guidance and relevant 
academic articles. 
 
This paper aims to contribute to the literature in various ways. It offers a critical comparison 
between the OECD’s cooperative compliance approach and the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring 
strategy. Moreover, in order to do so, it gives an overview of the steps to be taken in order to 
establish a trust basis for agreeing an HM covenant and analyses the various covenant 
obligations. Finally, it discusses some important issues of concern.  
 




Cooperative compliance can be defined as the establishment of a trust-based cooperative 
relationship between taxpayers and the tax authorities on the basis of voluntary tax compliance 
leading to the payment of the right amount of tax at the right time. Trust is built and maintained 
in the cooperative compliance relationship and is related to expectations of reciprocity. People 
put their trust in someone they find trustworthy. Relevant dimensions of trustworthiness in the 
trust-based cooperative compliance relationship are, first, competence and reliability, and, 
second, integrity, honesty and the commitment to concern and care. Taxpayers who are 
compliant and show they are willing to comply deserve more trust than taxpayers who will not 
or are not able to comply. Compliant behaviour evidences trustworthiness. 
 
The cooperative compliance model 
 
We construct the OECD’s cooperative compliance model by investigating the various OECD 
reports on the relationship between taxpayers and tax administrations, viz. “Enhanced 
Relationships, Cooperative Compliance” and “Building Better Tax Control Frameworks”, and 
define it as the voluntary tax cooperation between tax authorities and large companies based 
on six principles: the tax authorities must understand business activities, adopt an impartial 
attitude, respond proportionally, demonstrate openness and transparency - like taxpayers 
themselves, take enterprise-specific circumstances into account, and align supervision to the 
quality of a company’s TCF. A TCF can be described as an instrument of internal control 
specifically focussed on the tax function within a company (Bronzewska, 2016, pp. 293-299; 
Hoyng, Kloosterhof & MacPherson 2010, pp. 19-71). Thus, the model provides a theoretical 
description of the major principles of cooperative compliance. In Section 2, we will discuss the 
model in more detail. 
 
The Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model 
 
We define the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model as: a means of administrative supervision 
based on (informed) trust, mutual understanding and transparency between individual 
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taxpayers and the NTCA. The requirement of trust, understanding and transparency shows the 
underlying value of reciprocity. In exchange for providing relevant tax information on a 
voluntary basis, taxpayers obtain certainty about their tax liability in advance and are – in 
principle – no longer subject to time and effort-consuming tax audits, sanctions and prosecution 
afterwards. Thus, the model provides a theoretical description of the working of Horizontal 
Monitoring. In Section 3, we will discuss the model in more detail. 
 
2.  DESCRIPTION OF THE COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE MONITORING 
MODEL 
 
This chapter focusses on the question of how the OECD’s cooperative compliance monitoring 
model is defined (see also Bronzewska 2016, p. 44-48). To answer this question, we will focus 
on the OECD’s views on cooperative compliance as developed in two reports: “Enhanced 
Relationships” (2008, Section 2.1), and “Cooperative Compliance” (2013, Section 2.2).  
 
2.1  Investing in “Enhanced Relationships” (2008) 
 
The 2008 report “Enhanced Relationships” should, first and foremost, be considered in the 
light of its origins. In 2006, the OECD had noted that the rapidly evolving social environment 
in which tax authorities operate leaves room for aggressive tax planning. The 2008 report 
referred to the Seoul Declaration of September 2006 which “sets out countries’” concerns about 
the rapid spread of aggressively marketed tax planning, and the link between “unacceptable tax 
minimisation arrangements” and tax intermediaries (OECD, 2008, p. 7, pp. 9-10 ; OECD, 2006, 
p. 3). This is a recurring concern, as the 2013 report shows: “greater emphasis has been placed 
on the importance of compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of the law and this is 
reflected in the 2011 revision of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” (OECD, 
2013, p. 13). As a response, the OECD embarked on research as to how tax authorities might 
restrain such unwanted behaviour. Possible solutions included “enhancing relationships” with 
taxpayers who are willing and able to comply with the tax laws and regulations, while 
developing a risk management system to identify tax risks and differently approach taxpayers 
who are unwilling to comply (OECD, 2008, pp. 39-46; OECD, 2007e, p. 3. See also Alink & 
Van Kommer, 2000, pp. 63-67; Alink & Van Kommer, 2009, pp. 194-195). Risk rating, 
however, has its drawbacks (Bronzewska, 2016, pp. 334-335, pp. 359-361). Freedman (2010) 
argues that risk rating, whilst initially appearing to be a purely administrative device, can 
become a significant application of discretion, even going as far as to become an attempt to 
influence taxpayers to be over-compliant (p. 118; see also OECD, 2004). 
 
An enhanced relationship goes beyond the traditional relationship between taxpayers and tax 
authorities, which is characterised by parties interacting solely based on what is legally required 
(OECD, 2008, p. 39). Taxpayers are legally required to file tax returns that disclose a limited 
amount of information as required and to pay the tax due in time (OECD, 2008, p. 40). The tax 
authorities are legally allowed to question taxpayers about the tax returns they have filed, to 
obtain additional information, to adjust the amounts payable and to collect taxes. In this 
traditional relationship, there is no incentive to provide more tax information than is mandatory.  
 
An enhanced relationship, however, does provide that incentive. Taxpayers voluntarily enter 
into individual monitoring relationships, whilst voluntary and transparent regulatory 
compliance is rewarded with more certainty in advance and a reduction of (possible) 
subsequent tax audits, sanctions and prosecution, and thus lower compliance costs (OECD, 
2008, p. 40). Certainty is key indeed. A recent International Monetary Fund (IMF)/OECD 
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report again highlights that tax certainty is an important priority for both governments and 
businesses, outlining a set of concrete and practical tools that can be used to enhance tax 
certainty. Cooperative compliance is mentioned as one of the tools which can be used to 
provide early tax certainty (IMF & OECD, 2017, pp. 50-52). For an enhanced relationship to 
exist, it is, according to the OECD (2008), essential that tax authorities, taxpayers, and their 
financial and tax law specialists start to trust each other and maintain that trust (p. 39). Trust 
being the focus, this specifically defined institutional relationship is based on “mutually 
expressed intentions and not on detailed rules” (IFA, 2012, p. 18). The OECD clearly 
understands that trust is an important determinant of cooperative behaviour in the relationships 
between tax authorities and taxpayers. Trust should be granted to taxpayers who are found to 
be trustworthy. Therefore, mechanisms by which to establish the trustworthiness of taxpayers 
are required.    
 
To distinguish taxpayers who are willing and trustworthy from taxpayers who are not, tax 
authorities must, according to the OECD (2007f), invest in a risk management system (p. 1). 
Tax authorities should establish a tax risk profile for each taxpayer (risk assessment) which 
should enable them to organise a taxation process in view of the scarce enforcement resources 
and the different characteristics of taxpayers (risk-based resource allocation; see OECD, 2007e, 
p. 2). Taxpayers who behave transparently and represent a lower risk can reasonably expect 
the tax authorities to take a more cooperative approach and, therefore, to enjoy lower 
compliance costs, while taxpayers who are shown to represent a significant risk can expect to 
attract greater scrutiny and enforcement attention (OECD, 2008, p. 24; see also De Widt & 
Oats, 2017).  
 
In order to develop a so-called enhanced relationship model, the OECD used the models 
introduced by the Netherlands, Ireland and the United States in 2005 as examples (OECD, 
2007f, p. 3). The research shows that all three models take voluntary regulatory compliance as 
a principle and focus on levying in (real) time, advanced tax cooperation, and fewer audits and 
the like after tax returns have been filed. The ultimate goal is to improve the tax regulatory 
environment for particularly large companies. According to the OECD (2007f), the models 
share two common features (p. 4): 
 
I. the taxpayer is a large, often listed, company  
II. the taxpayer has, or wants to have, a low tax risk profile.  
 
Upon further investigation, the OECD enumerates five principles for a successful tax 
cooperation based on enhanced relationships: 
 
1) a tax authority must understand business activities (commercial 
awareness) 
2) a tax authority must adopt an impartial approach (impartiality) 
3) a tax authority should respond proportionally (proportionality) 
4) a tax authority should – like taxpayers themselves – be open and 
transparent (openness and transparency) 
5) a tax authority’s responses should be tailored to enterprise-specific 
circumstances (responsiveness).  
 
Taxpayers will find tax authorities to be trustworthy if they meet these principles. The five 
principles should therefore be operationalised in practice. With regard to commercial 
awareness, the OECD elaborates that large companies generally undertake transactions for 
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commercial reasons but structure them with a view to maximising profit after tax (OECD, 
2008, p. 34). Without understanding the commercial drivers, tax authorities potentially 
misunderstand the broader context of a transaction, and may respond in a way that results in 
potentially costly disputes and uncertainty. Therefore, they need to understand: i) the “business 
of how to do business”, i.e. the broad context within which large companies operate; ii) the 
characteristics of the industry sector in which a particular taxpayer operates; and iii) the unique 
characteristics of the particular taxpayer’s business (OECD, 2008, pp. 34-35). This can be 
achieved, for instance, through development programmes and other ways of giving tax 
authority personnel a taste of life in business or participation in wider community activities 
(OECD, 2008, p. 69, Annex 7.1: Achieving Commercial Awareness). 
 
The impartial approach requires tax authorities to resolve disputes consistently, objectively, 
and solely by reference to the merits of the case and reasonable legal positions (OECD, 2008, 
p. 74, Annex 7.2: The Impartial Approach). Moreover, if a tax inspector cannot maintain his 
position in court, it is inappropriate to leave the dispute unresolved. Court litigation is often 
“perceived as a battle which, by nature, can only have one winner”, so the other party is doomed 
to be the loser. The OECD points out that recent developments in the dispute resolution field 
have demonstrated that alternative dispute resolution (ADR) may be of assistance here. ADR 
refers to any form of dispute resolution that takes place separately from court litigation, such 
as mediation (OECD, 2008, p. 75). 
 
Proportionality requires tax authorities to approach choices – in allocating resources, for 
instance – from a broad perspective which takes into account the characteristics of the taxpayer 
in question, the relationship between the tax inspector and the taxpayer, and the potential 
benefits of pursuing or not pursuing a line of enquiry (OECD, 2008, p. 35). According to the 
OECD (2008), proportionality can be achieved, for instance, by focussing attention on 
significant issues and only where there are sufficient reasons for doing so or only asking 
appropriately focussed questions that seek information that will lead to a conclusion of the 
audit (p. 36). 
 
In addition, the OECD (2008) argues that taxpayers want to see openness and transparency 
from the tax authorities – for instance, with regard to advance tax ruling mechanisms in order 
to seek early certainty on the tax consequences of a particular set of circumstances or with 
regard to the tax authorities’ approach to risk management (p. 36). Taxpayers also want their 
collective voice to be heard through consultation on changes in the tax policy and the tax 
administration, with engagement taking place early enough to influence final decisions (OECD, 
2008, p. 37). 
 
What taxpayers prefer most in relation to tax is early and quick certainty (OECD, 2008, p. 37). 
The OECD rightly argues that tax authorities should therefore be responsive. Taxpayers should 
receive prompt, efficient and professional responses, and they may expect a fair and efficient 
decision-making process and definitive resolution of issues. Tax authorities, for instance, need 
to ensure that decisions taken at the operational level are consistent with the instructions and 
guidance of senior management. 
 
When these five principles have been met, according to the OECD (2007f), the majority of 
taxpayers will be able to effectively and efficiently pay the right amount of tax in time (p. 13). 
Although the OECD abandoned the label ”enhanced relationship“ in its cooperative 
compliance report of 2013 (see Section 2.2), it remains faithful to the five principles and even 
added a sixth one (OECD, 2013, p. 87):  
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6) companies must invest in a TCF and tax authorities must adjust their 
supervision accordingly (supervision adjustment to TCF). 
 
In Section 4, we investigate whether the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model meets these six 
principles. 
 
2.2  “From Enhanced Relationship to Cooperative Compliance” (2013) 
 
In 2013, the OECD abandoned the name “enhanced relationship”.  According to the OECD, 
the label was chosen as a term that properly distinguished the new approach from a traditional 
obligation-based relationship (OECD 2013, p. 14). The term “enhanced relationship”, 
however, raised questions about connotations of preferential tax treatment (OECD, 2013, p. 
14; De Widt and Oats, 2018, p. 262). Indeed, Dabner and Burton (2009) argue that “using the 
term “partnership” in Australia and New Zealand may have been unfortunate in that it perhaps 
created unreal expectations” (p. 326). They point at “the primacy of the ethical and contractual 
obligations of practitioners to their clients”. In the same vein, some tax advisors in the 
Netherlands worried that their enhanced relationship with the NTCA might be perceived by 
their clients as “too close”, in the sense that they would be seen as providing services to the 
NTCA, while, of course, their clients pay for their services. Although the OECD addressed the 
alleged unequal treatment – see Section 4.2 – the OECD abandoned the term “enhanced 
relationship” and replaced it with the term “cooperative compliance”, which would better 
represent the OECD’s tax compliance vision. According to the OECD: 
 
the term ‘cooperative compliance’ describes the concept most accurately as it not 
only describes the process of co-operation but also demonstrates its goal as part of 
the revenue body’s compliance risk management strategy: compliance leading to 
payment of the right amount of tax at the right time (OECD, 2013, p. 14).  
 
Moreover, the adjective “cooperative” emphasises the reciprocal nature of this relationship, 
which is aimed at enhancing compliance. Many tax professionals, however, already understood 
this. The 2012 International Fiscal Association (IFA) report, for example, recognises 
reciprocity as a common factor in enhanced relationship programmes: “Trust, mutual 
understanding, transparency, all with full reciprocity” (IFA, 2012, p. 17). 
 
Key components of a cooperative compliance framework are transparency and disclosure on 
the part of both parties, resulting in the effective and efficient reduction of uncertainties over 
tax positions. According to the OECD, good corporate governance systems – supporting 
transparency and disclosure – have recently become more important as an integral part of 
cooperative compliance. Disclosure should include relevant information and tax risks. There 
are two key elements of disclosure and transparency by taxpayers. First, a robust, reliable TCF 
that gives the tax authority assurance and enables the taxpayer to know which tax positions 
taken are uncertain or controversial, and second, “the willingness to disclose those positions 
voluntarily” (OECD, 2013, p. 20-21). As a result, the extent of reviews and audits of the tax 
returns submitted to the tax authority can be reduced significantly. Because of the information 
disclosed by the taxpayer, the tax authority may rely on the returns submitted to it and trust that 
uncertain tax positions and other “issues of doubt or difficulty in the tax positions taken in that 
return will be brought to its attention” (OECD, 2013, p. 62). Of course, the tax authorities also 
use other sources to check the information provided by taxpayers. In this regard, international 
exchange of information is a growing source of such “counter-information.” Good tax 
governance regards corporate taxpayers but also the tax authorities. Good governance within 
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the tax authorities themselves is therefore also a driver of cooperative compliance, comprising 
transparency, openness and responsiveness, including, for example, real-time working. 
 
While the pillars of an enhanced relationship were still considered to be valid, major new issues 
had emerged as the approach had matured and became more widespread. This included the 
development of compliance risk management strategies by tax authorities that focus on 
effectively influencing and improving taxpayer compliancy. In order to influence taxpayer 
compliancy, the OECD considered it important not only that tax authorities invest in risk 
management systems, but also that companies invest in TCFs (OECD, 2016 and OECD, 2013, 
p. 14; see also van der Enden & Bronzewska, 2014). In passing, we note that there are no sharp 
criteria and rules for a TCF. It is generally seen as a vague and open-ended standard. 
Bronzewska and van der Enden (2014), therefore, argue that “tax administrations should issue 
guidance on a TCF. Without further guidance on a TCF, the concept of cooperative compliance 
will fail under pressure of ineffective and inefficient audit processes and mismanaged 
expectations” (p. 640).  
 
In passing, we mention that, in 2016, the OECD published follow-up guidance with respect to 
the investment in a TCF: “Building Better Tax Control Frameworks”. Again, disclosure and 
transparency are key. The latter refers to the sharing of information about the internal control 
system (including the design), and the implementation and effectiveness of the TCF which 
enables the taxpayer to be fully aware and “in control” of all the positions and issues that need 
to be disclosed (OECD, 2016, p. 14). Moreover, as a result of the BEPS project, it has become 
“even more crucial for multinational enterprises to be in control of tax risks today than when 
the 2013 Report was written.” (OECD, 2016, p. 12). Since it is not possible to prescribe a one-
size-fits-all system of internal and tax control, the OECD (2016) identifies six essential 
building blocks: 1) tax strategy established; 2) applied comprehensively; 3) responsibility 
assigned; 4) governance documented; 5) testing performed; and 6) assurance provided (p. 15). 
The TCF and, more specifically, the building blocks are used as a mechanism by which to 
support the tax authority’s trust in the taxpayer. Nonetheless, regardless of whether or not a 
TCF is based on the aforementioned building blocks, according to the OECD (2016), tax 
authorities do not provide sign off on how the eventual tax return is produced and tax authorities 
are not obliged to approve the tax compliance process within the company (p. 24). As the focus 
of this paper is on the trust-based Horizontal Monitoring relationship and its establishment, we 
will not elaborate on the TCF (which is a key element of further cooperation among tax 
administrations. See the International Compliance Assurance Programme (ICAP), a 
programme for a multilateral cooperative risk assessment and assurance process (OECD, 
2018).   
 
Cooperative compliance is part of a broader compliance strategy developed by the OECD. In 
its 2014 report “Tax Compliance by Design”, the OECD focusses on the compliance 
improvement of smaller companies and presents a broader focus on tax monitoring. 
Cooperative compliance is only one of the tools that can be used to improve tax compliance. 
Smaller companies may, according to the OECD, be better served by tax administrations 
gathering information directly from third parties than larger companies that can entertain 
individual monitoring relationships. The idea is that when regulatory compliance in the 
environment of taxpayers is the norm, it is also easier for them to comply with the rules and 
more difficult not to comply (OECD, 2014, p. 21). Two different scenarios are described: 1) 
establishing a secured information chain (the secured chain approach); and 2) sharing 
information resources (the centralised data approach). For larger and medium-sized companies, 
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 5:1 2019                                          Cooperative Compliance and the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring Model 
78 
 
the first system  can be effective. However, for smaller companies, the second system may 
produce better results (OECD, 2014, p. 44). 
 
3.  THE DESIGN OF THE DUTCH HORIZONTAL MONITORING MODEL 
 
This section focusses on the question of how Horizontal Monitoring is incorporated into the 
Dutch tax legal system. What are the different steps to be taken in the process of concluding a 
Horizontal Monitoring covenant and how do the voluntarily accepted Horizontal Monitoring 
covenant obligations relate to the mandatory obligations laid down in the Dutch legal tax 
system? To answer this question, we will first present the key characteristics of the Dutch 
Horizontal Monitoring model (Section 3.1), then we will focus on the establishment of a 
Horizontal Monitoring relationship (Section 3.2) and, subsequently, analyse tax cooperation 
based on a covenant (Section 3.3).  
 
3.1  Key characteristics of the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model  
 
The main characteristics of the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model are: 
 
1) discretion as the basis for supervision  
2) tax cooperation based on a covenant 
3) additional rules in published guidance  
4) rights and obligations pursuant to traditional legislation and regulations 
remain applicable. 
 
1)  Discretion as the basis for supervision  
 
Although Horizontal Monitoring has no specific legal basis, the NTCA may arrange the 
enforcement process on the basis of discretion and may develop public guidelines. The 
Ministry of Finance and the NTCA have – within the limits of tax law, jurisprudence and 
general principles of law, including the general principles of proper administrative behaviour 
and published guidance – the flexibility to arrange the enforcement process and to apply 
customised supervision (Stevens Committee, 2012a, pp. 93-95). 
 
2)  Tax cooperation based on a covenant  
 
Although general rules on Horizontal Monitoring can be found in published guidance, the 
individual cooperation is based on a covenant, which may be classified a private mutual 
agreement (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, p. 441, p. 182). The covenant contains agreements which go 
beyond actual statutory rights and obligations; these additional covenant obligations have no 
basis in public law. By classifying the covenant as a private agreement, the additional 
obligations not only bind the NTCA but also the taxpayers. The possibility of an appeal to the 
civil court provides taxpayers with an opportunity to gain an independent assessment of the 
functioning of the NTCA under Horizontal Monitoring (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, p. 441, p. 208). 
For example, if the NTCA does not take an important deadline for responding to a tax-relevant 
question submitted by the taxpayer into account, the taxpayer may appeal to the civil court (in 
interim injunction proceedings). Where the bar on some aspects regarding the quality of the 
NTCA’s (extra-statutory) service is set higher – like fulfilling the covenant obligations “as soon 
as possible” – these aspects are not assessed by an administrative (tax) judge. The qualification 
of the covenant as a private law agreement allows for the civil court to assess these aspects. 
Nonetheless, if the NTCA and the taxpayer cannot solve problems among themselves and take 
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recourse to the court, the trust basis of their relationship will probably be seriously impaired, 
which may effectively mean the end of their Horizontal Monitoring relationship. 
 
3)  Additional rules in published guidance  
 
For taxpayers with individual covenants, the guidance published by the NTCA is the most 
important communication to rely on. Good guidance plays a critical role in building trust; 
transparency with regard to the interaction process breeds trust in the NTCA and voluntary 
compliance (Kirchler, 2007, p. 203; Siglé, Goslinga, Speklé, van der Hel & Veldhuizen, 2018, 
pp. 13-14). Moreover, the NTCA is bound by publishing its guidance (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, 
p. 441, pp. 134-135); thus, soft law becomes binding on the basis of the General Administrative 
Law Act. Conversely, guidance on Horizontal Monitoring, like all policy rules issued by the 
(tax) administration, cannot legally bind the taxpayer; a general binding character is missing 
(Gribnau, 2007).  
 
4)  Rights and obligations pursuant to legislation and regulations remain applicable 
 
Not only do rights and obligations that already existed before a covenant has been concluded 
remain applicable, such as a granted postponement of tax payment, statutory tax rules still 
apply in a covenant situation. The latter leaves space for the NTCA to adjust its supervision 
when the taxpayer’s attitude and behaviour indicate that the principle of being willing to fulfil 
its statutory obligations is no longer satisfied. Therefore, the soft approach is backed by 
sanctions, audits and the like. 
 
3.2  The establishment of a Horizontal Monitoring relationship 
 
The primary task of the NTCA is to levy the proper amount of tax. Nowadays, this task consists 
not only of levying and collecting taxes, but also of the promotion of compliance. Horizontal 
Monitoring is an important means by which to promote compliance. General rules on 
Horizontal Monitoring can be found in published guidance, while the individual cooperation is 
based on a covenant. Nonetheless, the relationship between the taxpayer and the NTCA is 
embedded in public law because the NTCA is a public body exercising a public task. Thus, the 
covenant has a somewhat hybrid character, merging public and private law obligations. Of 
course, Horizontal Monitoring itself is also a hybrid form of oversight or governance, since 
both the tax authorities and taxpayer are responsible for tax enforcement. Sharing responsibility 
is in strong contrast with traditional, vertical, tax supervision. The hybrid character of the 
covenant makes private law on top of public law applicable. We will return to this aspect in 
Section 3.3.  
 
Taxpayers and the NTCA go through seven steps in order to enter into Horizontal Monitoring 
relationships (NTCA, 2013, with reference to NTCA, 2010, p. 11; see also Bronzewska, 2016, 
pp. 137-141; Stevens Committee, 2012a, p. 40-42; Veldhuizen, 2015, pp. 150-153. De Widt & 








Journal of Tax Administration Vol 5:1 2019                                          Cooperative Compliance and the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring Model 
80 
 
1)  an up-to-date client profile (including strategic supervision plan) 
2) a Horizontal Monitoring meeting 
3) a compliance scan 
4) resolution of pending issues 
5) the conclusion of a covenant 
6) analysis and improvement of the tax control system 
7) adjustment of supervision. 
 
The process begins with an update of the client profile by the NTCA gathering information on 
the relevant taxpayer (NTCA, 2013, pp. 10-14). On the basis of a positive client profile, the 
NTCA develops a strategic supervision plan. This supervision plan forms the basis of the 
process towards the establishment of a Horizontal Monitoring relationship and consists of four 
parts: obtaining an up-to-date client profile; the analysis of the client profile; the supervision 
strategy; and intended supervisory activities. 
 
In this context, a case team from the NTCA gathers information about the company’s tax 
attitude, behaviour and internal (tax) control. The determination of the desired effect on 
behaviour and tax control, and the selection of instruments to be deployed to achieve this effect 
in the most efficient manner are important in this respect. The aim of the process is to answer 
the question of whether the company’s tax attitude, behaviour and tax control inspire the 
NTCA’s trust. In Section 3.3, we will focus on the definition of trust in more detail. In this 
phase, it is important for taxpayers to demonstrate their willingness to disclose tax-relevant 
information, including tax planning strategies, on a voluntary basis. Even before concluding a 
covenant, transparency – one of the key elements of Horizontal Monitoring – is crucial.  
 
The objective of the Horizontal Monitoring meeting is to explore the feasibility of 
implementing Horizontal Monitoring. The meeting consists of an exploration of the key 
principles by the NTCA, an exchange of information about favourable and unfavourable 
elements of the existing contracts, a mutual assessment of the tone at the top, confirmation of 
the responsibilities and expectations of each party, and the reaching of an agreement about the 
next steps in the process (NTCA, 2013, pp. 14-17). The compliance scan is carried out by 
interviewing a number of the company’s key officers and yields an improved insight into the 
tax attitude (the willingness to comply) and the fulfilment of preconditions attached to the 
achievement of adequate tax control (the ability to comply) (NTCA, 2013, pp. 17-22). Topics 
to be discussed include: strategic objectives; internal control environment; information 
systems; tax function; external monitoring and advice; and the tax attitude and behaviour of 
the organisation.  
 
Resolution of pending tax issues deals with issues which are known at the start of the Horizontal 
Monitoring process (NTCA, 2013, pp. 22-24). Settling pending issues clears the way for real-
time working. As a result, the Horizontal Monitoring relationship can be laid down in a 
covenant (NTCA, 2013, pp. 24-28). A standard text has been developed for individual 
covenants (see Appendix). The standard text, however, contains no agreements regarding, for 
example, contact persons, procedural aspects and similar items. Such working agreements are 
recorded in a separate consultation report.  
 
After conclusion of the covenant, there is still room for analysis and improvement of the tax 
control system (NTCA, 2013, pp. 28-36). The company bears primary responsibility for the 
improvement. However, the NTCA actively encourages and supports the company in this 
process. Each company has a unique TCF as part of a more extensive business control 
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 5:1 2019                                          Cooperative Compliance and the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring Model 
81 
 
framework (Stevens Committee, 2012a, pp. 42-44; for the relation between TCF and business 
control framework, see Bronzewska & van der Enden, 2014, p. 639). It is argued that the “TCF 
is the prime focus in the horizontal monitoring programme” (van der Enden, de Groot, & van 
der Stroom, 2010, p. 337). The TCF should – based on organisational factors and decisions on 
the required scope and quality of the internal control framework – be customised to the specific 
company. The NTCA has formulated eight sub-processes to optimise the tax control process 
(NTCA, 2013, p. 28-30). These sub-processes, however, do not provide minimum 
requirements for the establishment of a tax control process, but they point to the result of the 
tax control process; such as an overview of relevant tax events in the various segments of the 
company, a tax planning strategy that fits with the company’s compliance strategy, and 
identification and management of tax risks (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, p. 446, pp. 151-153).  
 
The final step of the Horizontal Monitoring process is the adjustment of supervision. In this 
step, the NTCA adjusts the form and intensity of its supervision based on available information 
about the company. Preliminary information about the company’s tax strategy, tax control and 
transparency (the client profile) is of particular relevance to the reduction of the tax authority’s 
monitoring workload (NTCA, 2013, p. 40. See also Stevens Committee, 2012a, pp. 44-47). 
 
The NTCA has been very successful in concluding covenants. It should be noted, however, 
that not all companies want to engage with the NTCA’s trust approach and some therefore 
refrain from participating in joining the HM programme. In particular, foreign multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) originating from tax cultures with more adversarial relationships between 
the tax administration and (corporate) taxpayers tend to stay out of Horizontal Monitoring more 
frequently. Finally, due to its rapid expansion and the higher than expected administrative 
demands, Horizontal Monitoring “has been unable to generate clear administrative 
efficiencies” (De Widt, 2017, p. 22).  
 
3.3  Tax cooperation based on a covenant 
 
Besides the general provisions on parties, duration, commencement date, evaluation and 
termination, the covenant or compliance agreement consists of an introduction expressing the 
intention to achieve an effective and efficient mode of operation, basic principles and 
agreements.  
 
3.3.1  Basic principles 
 
The covenant contains three basic principles: 
 
1) Parties base their relationship on trust, mutual understanding and 
transparency. 
2) Rights and obligations pursuant to legislation and regulations are and will 
remain applicable without limitation. 
3) The agreement is applicable to levying of all Dutch national taxes and 
collection. 
 
The first principle is that parties base their relationship on trust, mutual understanding and 
transparency. This principle reflects the underlying value of reciprocity, since it has to be 
observed by both parties. Modern government leaves room for citizens and companies to bear 
responsibility. This is not “blind” trust, as we know in personal relationships, but a more 
business-like trust or “informed” trust. To trust someone in a personal relationship means to 
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“accept vulnerability to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will 
perform a particular action important to you, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control 
that other party” (Six, 2004, pp. 179-180). Accepting this vulnerability is taking a risk. A 
rational actor perspective on trust assumes that individuals will rationally place trust on the 
basis of a cost-benefit analysis (Coleman, 1990, p. 104). Gangl, Hofmann and Kirchler (2012) 
do not emphasise the utility maximisation dimension of trust (calculating profits and gains) 
that much. They use the conception of reason-based trust, which corresponds to “trust 
developed by a rational actor who trusts that there are good reasons to expect the other will 
forgo opportunistic goals” (Gangl, Hofmann & Kirchler, 2012, p. 8; “reason-based trust” 
results from a deliberate – i.e. rational – decision grounded on four criteria: goal achievement, 
dependency, internal factors and external factors). Yet another definition is provided by Baier 
(1995): “letting other persons (natural or artificial, such as firms, nations, etc.) take care of 
something the trustor cares about, where such “caring” involves some exercise of discretionary 
powers” (p. 105). A final, broad definition of trust is “the willingness to take some risk in 
relation to other individuals on the expectation that the others will reciprocate” (Walker & 
Ostrom, 2003, p. 382). These different definitions emphasise various aspects of trust that are 
relevant here, as will be shown.  
 
Trust is an important determinant of cooperative behaviour in social relations and social 
organisations. Such activity requires the cooperators to do their part. The deep and important 
value of trust is often taken for granted (for some facets of the relationship between trust and 
taxation, see Peeters, Gribnau & Badisco, 2017). Indeed, trust in trustworthy people to do their 
bit in some worthwhile cooperative enterprise, the benefits of which are fairly shared among 
all the co-operators is, to most people, “an obviously good thing, and not just because we get 
better bread that way” (Baier, 1991, p. 110). Trust thus motivates cooperation in a worthwhile 
enterprise in which the trusting and trusted parties are involved (Baier, 1991, p. 111). Once 
trust is established, people are willing to assume greater risks, to work harder and to reciprocate 
(Dirks & Skarlicki, 2004, p. 27). This also requires openness when expectations are not 
fulfilled; to report, explain, discuss, and solve problems that arise. Indeed, trust is to be seen as 
a dynamic “process, of gaining, maintaining and restoring trust when it breaks down” 
(Nooteboom, 2018, p. 30). 
 
Parties taking unilateral action or undertaking a transaction invest resources while running the 
risk that they will not receive an expected return; they make themselves vulnerable. One takes 
a risk that depends on the performance of another actor. Thus, trust involves “the incorporation 
of risk into the decision of whether or not to engage in the action” (Coleman, 1990, p. 91). 
Trusting someone therefore implies that there is some risk of suffering “a loss if that someone 
does not fulfil your trust after you have acted on that trust” (Hardin, 2006, p. 28). However, the 
risk to be taken concerns costs as well as benefits of possible actions. Net (long-term) benefits 
may be gained since individuals are willing to take risks by placing trust in others to behave in 
cooperative and non-exploitative ways. Proactive voluntary disclosure may involve such a risk 
from the perspective of a company. Trust placed in others depends on information that comes 
from personal experience of an individual with particular others. The choice of a partner who 
we decide to trust is therefore highly informed (Rus, 2005, p. 83). 
 
Trust may, in general, be a good thing, but it is not always the right thing. Trustworthiness is 
therefore an important requirement, enabling one to decide whether or not to place trust in 
someone. Trust is granted to people we find trustworthy. There is some empirical evidence that 
there are at least two relevant dimensions that compose our judgments of trustworthiness. 
These intertwined dimensions are: (1) competence or reliability; and (2) motivation, which 
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consists of the following components – integrity, honesty and the commitment to “do no harm” 
(or concern and care). Both dimensions are related to trust based on cognitive-rational 
processes. The first dimension, often referred to as cognitive-based trust, entails one’s 
competence (ability) to perform what one is trusted to do and reliance on someone being 
capable of performing the actions required (Hardin, 2006, p. 36). Competence can be 
“technical, concerning the available means, knowledge and skill” (Nooteboom, 2018, p. 33). 
The various aforementioned steps (Section 3.2) serve to assure the NTCA of a taxpayer’s 
competence and reliability. For example, previous evidence collected through recent audits and 
the company’s improved tax controls may show competence and reliability – the company is 
actually performing what it is trusted and expected to do. Competence requirements for tax 
officials regard, for example, their technical knowledge of tax regulations, communication 
skills, business awareness, ability to treat taxpayers as customers, network and support within 
the tax administration, and ability to quickly resolve issues raised by companies (Björklund 
Larsen, Bol, Brögger, Kettunen, Potka-Soininen, Pellinen, Brehm Johansen & Aziz, 2018, pp. 
64-65). With regard to the second dimension, the motivation to perform, the commitment to do 
no harm (or concern and care) is sometimes replaced by “benevolence”. Benevolence is defined 
as “the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor, aside from an 
egocentric profit motive” (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995, p. 718; Schoorman, Mayer & 
Davis, 2007, p. 345). This factor is also at work in a Horizontal Monitoring relationship (see 
also Björklund Larsen et al., 2018, pp. 95-97). The tone at the top, for example, may show the 
motivation, the willingness to be (proactively) compliant and transparent, that convinces the 
NTCA to take further steps towards a covenant. 
 
The two dimensions are closely related: actual behaviour expresses taxpayers’ intention to 
cooperate (Kasper, Kogler & Kirchler, 2013, p. 4). The three components of “the motivation 
to perform-dimension” deserve special attention in so-called power-asymmetric relationships, 
such as the traditional one between the tax inspector (with extensive legal powers) and the 
taxpayer. In a relationship in which there is a power difference between the actors, it may be 
difficult to develop trust (for symmetric and asymmetric trust relations, see Coleman, 1990, pp. 
178-180; Dusarduijn, 2018, p. 67). The more powerful actor’s behaviour can substantially 
diminish trust, unless he or she reflects honesty and integrity (Gerbasi & Cook, 2009, p. 223).  
Note that the NTCA’s client managers have to become a new type of tax official: “T-shaped 
knowledge experts”, having an understanding of technical tax issues, the organisation and 
working practices of the NTCA, and “the culture and operational practices of the large 
corporate and the external world in which the large corporate operates.” (Tuck, 2010, p. 593). 
This tax administrator needs to have detailed technical knowledge (competence) of the 
increasingly complex tax legislation (the vertical part of the T shape) and “a new broader 
knowledge of “soft skills” such as non-confrontational meeting skills, customer service skills, 
and treating taxpayers as customers, in addition to greater specialist knowledge” of 
multinational companies (the horizontal part of the T; Tuck, 2010, p. 594). Multinational 
companies are indeed becoming increasingly complex organisations with group operations 
worldwide, and complex internal structures and decision-making procedures. A trust approach 
therefore requires a rather different mindset from tax officials who are often used to relying on 
traditional, hierarchical interactions with taxpayers. This does not come naturally. Some staff 
have shown that they find it difficult to change from adopting an antagonistic approach with 
an emphasis on control to establishing a cooperative trust relationship (Stevens Committee, 
2012a, p. 973; De Widt, 2017, pp. 21-22; see also BMF, 2016, p. 63). 
 
Trust is linked to the concept of mutual understanding. To build trust, parties engage in actions 
explicitly designed to lead the other party to place trust in them. To be successful, these actions 
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must be based on “an understanding (intuitive or explicit) of the potential trustor’s basis for 
deciding whether or not to place trust” (Whiting, 1998, p. 179, referring to Coleman, 1990). 
Mutual understanding comes quite close to empathy. Empathy is the capacity to accurately 
understand the position of others – to feel that “this could happen to me” (Trout, 2009, p. 21). 
When people empathise with others, they try to understand their inner states by placing 
themselves in their situation or taking their perspective. In order to judge trustworthiness and 
its limits, one must understand what determines actions and their outcomes. According to 
Nooteboom (2018), this insight enables empathy: “the ability to put yourself in the shoes of the 
other, to see where you can help, to prevent problems, but also to assess the risks you run” (p. 
34). The principle of (reciprocal) understanding, enabling empathy, reflects the commitment 
to concern and care, a component of the second dimension involved in judgments of 
trustworthiness. One party showing a commitment to concern and care is a condition for the 
other party’s acceptance of vulnerability to the actions of that party. In the asymmetric 
relationship between the tax authorities and the taxpayer, the powerful tax authorities bear 
special responsibility in this respect.  
 
Note that large companies possess superior economic and political power entailing a kind of 
power symmetry which may (partially) counterbalance the legal asymmetry, that is, the legal 
power of the NTCA. “Thus, even if large organisations perceive tax authorities to be powerful, 
they may be less likely to feel ‘threatened’ by this power” (Siglé et al., 2018, p. 14). Indeed, 
the NTCA’s aim to increase knowledge amongst tax officials about the way businesses operate 
and the administrative needs this generates amongst corporate taxpayers contributed to an 
increase in mutual professional understanding. These taxpayers reciprocate by putting effort 
in, making it credible to the NTCA that they hold genuine intentions of cooperating with the 
NTCA on the basis of mutual trust, understanding and transparency. “Hence, under HM the 
attitude of both corporates and tax administrators has shifted from an adversarial ‘them and us’ 
relationship, to one stronger characterised by cooperation” (De Widt, 2017, p. 31.) 
 
Thus, in a Horizontal Monitoring relationship, the taxpayer and the NTCA do not place trust 
blindly. As argued, they engage in actions designed to lead the other party to place trust in 
them. In a tax context, these actions may, of course, consist of the exchange of information. 
Mutual transparency, referring to openness between the taxpayer and the NTCA, is of special 
importance in this respect. A taxpayer’s transparency and openness with regard to relevant 
information (facts, actual or potential views on positions over which the NTCA may disagree, 
et cetera) promotes cognitive-based trust. The provision of information and services by tax 
authorities helps taxpayers to trust the tax authority (Gangl, Muehlbacher, de Groot, Goslinga, 
Hofmann, Kogler & Kirchler, 2013). Transparency in the sense of communicating openly with 
taxpayers in order to inform and educate them about their rights and obligations may also 
fortify the NTCA’s trustworthiness (see Cipek, 2018, p. 1). Both taxpayers and tax authorities 
show their trustworthiness, that is, their capability to perform the task of providing information 
and, by doing so, that they can be relied on to provide one another with relevant information. 
It is also a matter of being open in the sense of “telling the truth about what can be expected” 
(Nooteboom, 2018, p. 33). Moreover, when a problem arises, one should report it immediately, 
explain what went wrong, offer to help to solve it, and take measures to prevent such problems 
from arising in the future. Furthermore, having a transparent and open attitude with regard to 
relevant information expresses the motivational components of integrity and honesty. When 
something goes wrong, one should give the other party the benefit of the doubt – be willing to 
listen and allow him or her to explain and make amends (Nooteboom, 2018, p. 33). 
Transparency is therefore a key value to be reciprocally observed in a Horizontal Monitoring 
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relationship. Thus, the various procedural steps to conclude a covenant are taken by the NTCA 
and the taxpayer in order to establish and secure a trust-based relationship.     
The Horizontal Monitoring relationship illustrates that trust is related to expectations of 
reciprocity. To obtain the NTCA’s trust, the taxpayer will reciprocate trust by fulfilling his 
legal obligations. Important factors affecting the cooperative decisions are the parties’ capacity 
to learn more about each other’s characteristics, viz. competence, reliability and motivation, 
which consists of the components integrity, honesty and the commitment to do no harm, and 
the ability to build reputations for being trustworthy (keeping promises and “performing 
actions with short-term costs but long-term benefits”) (Ostrom, 2003, p. 43). Trust is thus an 
expectation about another’s future cooperation based on reputations for trustworthiness. In 
short, with regard to reciprocal behaviour, “both the past (through reputations) and the future 
(through expectations) matter” (McCabe, 2003, p. 150).   
 
Although the NTCA also accepts vulnerability in respect of the actions of taxpayers, relying 
on taxpayers’ voluntary provision of tax-relevant information, under the covenant, it “trusts” 
by “knowing less” about the facts and figures but “knowing more” about the company (NTCA, 
2010, p. 8). By receiving information from the company on its tax strategy, tax control and 
transparency (the client profile), the NTCA reduces its vulnerability and seeks to run (only) a 
reasonable risk. Here, the two dimensions of trustworthiness are at play: the taxpayer’s 
demonstration of competence, reliability, integrity, honesty, and its commitment to “do no 
harm” enables the NTCA’s acceptance of vulnerability to the taxpayer’s actions. The NTCA 
calls this (degree of) trust “justified trust” and defines that as “the favourable expectations of 
the behaviour of the other party that have in part developed as a result of the observed behaviour 
and the information that is collected” (NTCA, 2010, p. 77).  
 
Given the importance of the mutual gathering of information – to reduce the risk of damaging 
established trust – we prefer to use the term “informed trust”. This term has no other meaning 
than the term “justified trust” used by the NTCA, but emphasises the mutual gathering of 
information as the basis for building and justifying trust, and thus establishing, reinforcing and 
securing the trust-based relationship. Therefore, we consider “trust” in a Horizontal Monitoring 
relationship as informed trust and describe it as follows (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, p. 158): 
“Informed trust can be referred to when both NTCA and taxpayer accept vulnerability to 
actions of each other, based upon the expectation that both will perform actions important to 
the other, while parties try to reduce their vulnerability back and forth by gathering information 
from or about the other”, and moreover, discuss their diverging qualifications of this 
information.  
 
The NTCA describes mutual understanding as the willingness to put oneself in the other’s place 
and to understand the other party’s perspective (NTCA, 2013, p. 7). It is therefore important 
that the NTCA understands the commercial interests of the company and relevant deadlines. 
Within a Horizontal Monitoring relationship, it is also important that the NTCA understands 
the circumstances in which financial and tax law specialists act; these specialists must entertain 
good relationships with the client, on the one hand, and with NTCA, on the other (NTCA, 2013, 
pp. 54-56; see also Stevens Committee, 2012a, pp. 99-100). In addition, mutual understanding 
plays a pivotal role in the consultation of appropriate solutions; parties are expected to respond 
to mistakes with understanding (Stevens Committee, 2012a, pp. 97-98). This implies the 
parties’ willingness to enter into discussion about the cause of the mistakes (and the best way 
to redress them) and about measures necessary to prevent mistakes from being made in the 
future (NTCA, 2013, pp. 51-54; see also Stevens Committee, 2012a, pp. 97-98). The challenge 
is to tackle mistakes while maintaining the mutual relationship. Because serious mistakes 
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should be fined according to the law, both the NTCA and the taxpayer may perceive a fine or 
another sanction as a serious threat to a good working relationship.  
 
Mutual transparency refers to openness between taxpayers and the NTCA. The taxpayer must 
be transparent about its tax strategy and relevant issues, and must provide open answers to 
questions (NTCA, 2013, p. 7). The NTCA must be open about the background of its questions 
and the implementation of its supervision. The NTCA expects taxpayers with covenants to be 
so transparent that they always give clear presentations of their tax affairs. Indeed, empirical 
research shows that companies with HM covenants are more transparent, have better tax 
control mechanisms, and file correct and complete tax returns more often than companies 
without covenants (NTCA, 2017).  
 
The second principle is that rights and obligations pursuant to legislation and regulations are 
and will remain applicable without limitation. This does not only imply that rights and 
obligations that already existed before concluding the covenant remain applicable, but also that 
statutory tax rules and partly unwritten principles of proper administrative behaviour will apply 
in a covenant situation (see Section 4.1). 
 
The third principle is that the covenant is applicable to the levying of all Dutch national taxes 
and the collection thereof. To qualify for a covenant, taxpayers should be subject to one or 
more Dutch national taxes, such as VAT or corporation tax. The covenant, subsequently, refers 
to all national taxes to which the taxpayer is subject.  
 
3.3.2  Mutual covenant agreements 
 
In addition to the principles, the covenant contains four categories of mutual agreements: 
  
1) agreements on the realisation of customised tax supervision  
2) agreements on actual tax collection  
3) agreements on actual insight into the taxpayer´s tax position 
4) agreements on updating the NTCA on the taxation process (real-time 
working).  
 
The agreements help to effectuate willingness towards regulatory compliance into tax 
behaviour and to ensure the taxpayer’s and the NTCA’s trustworthiness. The reciprocal 
proactive provision of information enhances transparency and is essential to the formation and 
maintenance of trust. Parties being proactively transparent (beyond what the law requires) show 
their capability to provide information (competence) and reliability in fulfilling their promise 
to do so. Actual behaviour reflects the parties’ intention to cooperate. Thus, by actually 
providing their partner with relevant information, their motivation to perform the (voluntary) 
obligation of providing information comes to light and, with it, its components of integrity, 
honesty and the commitment to “concern and care”. Thus, the cognitive and motivational 
dimensions that are relevant to parties’ judgments of trustworthiness are “fleshed out” in 
concrete agreements and obligations.  
 
The covenant contains voluntary agreements which go beyond the taxpayer’s and the NTCA’s 
actual statutory rights and obligations. These additional covenant obligations have no basis in 
public law; they are voluntarily agreed upon. The trust-relationship, rather than traditional tax 
law, is the source of parties’ compliance with these extra-statutory obligations. By classifying 
the covenant as a private agreement, the obligations legally bind not only the NTCA but also 
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the taxpayers (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, p. 441, pp. 169-182). Voluntary mutual covenant 
agreements are the basis for tax cooperation under Horizontal Monitoring. These agreements 
are discussed below.  
 
1.  Agreements on the realisation of customised tax supervision  
 
Taxpayers are obliged to implement systems of internal control, internal audit and external 
audit aimed at preparing and filing acceptable tax returns. A taxpayer is statutorily obliged to 
keep records and books in such a way that there are clear rights and obligations for taxation at 
all times (Article 52 GTA 1959). The NTCA may inspect the financial administration and the 
taxpayer is obliged to cooperate. This cooperation does not only include making records, books 
and other data available, but also providing insight into the organisational mechanisms to 
identify and control tax risks (Parliamentary documents (Kamerstukken) II, 1988/89, 21 287, 
nr. 3, p. 12). The complete set of administrative procedures and techniques, as well as the 
product of the administrative process, are part of the administration (NTCA, 2013, p. 43). This 
obligation to have an administration under Horizontal Monitoring does not differ under the 
statutory legal Dutch framework. The procedures and techniques to take care of a system of 
internal control, internal audit and external audit are also part of the administration.  
 
So far, with regard to the scope of the administration, there is no difference between Horizontal 
Monitoring and the traditional legal requirements. However, there is a difference in the level 
of tax control. The level of tax control is higher under Horizontal Monitoring than under the 
existing legal framework. Taxpayers participating in Horizontal Monitoring are assumed to 
bear more responsibility, which is expressed through taking additional tax control measures. 
“Additional” depends on the nature, size and complexity of the company. In so far as the 
company has to take additional tax control measures, the scope of the administration increases 
compared to traditional monitoring. 
 
In addition, the corresponding obligation to adjust the form and intensity of the supervision to 
the quality of the system of internal control, internal audit and external audit goes beyond 
traditional tax monitoring and the actual statutory rights and obligations. Under traditional 
monitoring, the NTCA makes a risk assessment and aligns the monitoring. Under Horizontal 
Monitoring, the NTCA is committed to adjust the form and intensity of the supervision to the 
quality of the internal control framework, internal audit and external audit. As a consequence, 
under Horizontal Monitoring, the NTCA has to take additional measures in order to take 
enterprise-specific circumstances into account as well.  
 
2.  Agreements on actual tax collection 
 
In our view, the agreements concerning actual tax collection do not go beyond the actual 
statutory rights and obligations: the obligations to ensure timely payment of tax debts and 
refunds are not different from traditional tax monitoring (Article 9 in conjunction with Article 
2, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph e, Tax Collection Act 1990; see also NTCA, 2013, pp. 45-47).  
 
3.  Agreements on the actual insight into the taxpayer´s tax position 
 
The agreements relating to updating the NTCA’s insight into the tax position of a taxpayer go 
beyond the actual statutory obligations. Companies with covenants are required to disclose 
their actual or potential views on relevant tax issues (the HM covenant states: “view, taken or 
to be taken, on relevant (tax) matters”) to the NTCA and the NTCA is obliged to provide 
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answers (NTCA, 2013, pp. 36-40). Under the agreement, taxpayers do not only have the right 
to submit questions to the NTCA about its view on the application of the law, but also have an 
obligation to – especially with regard to actual or potential views on which the NTCA may 
disagree. The obligation to submit relevant tax positions to the NTCA goes beyond traditional 
tax monitoring. Under the existing legal framework, this obligation does not exist.  
 
In the same vein, the corresponding obligation to (periodically) discuss (relevant) tax and other 
matters submitted by the taxpayer, as far as possible in consultation with the taxpayer, while 
relevant terms are taken into account, goes beyond statutory rights and obligations. In addition 
to the traditional practice of answering legal questions, under Horizontal Monitoring, the 
NTCA must also discuss and answer factual and mixed questions (regarding facts and the law), 
while the relevant deadlines for taxpayers should be taken into account (with regard to 
answering factual and legal questions, see De Widt, 2017, pp. 29-30).  
  
4.  Agreements on updating the NTCA on the taxation process (real-time working)  
 
Finally, the agreements about keeping the NTCA up to date on the tax process go beyond 
statutory rights and obligations. Although a taxpayer who is subject to traditional monitoring 
is also obliged to file a tax return and to provide information, the covenant requires that the 
obligations are fulfilled as soon as possible. The transparency-based cooperation also implies 
that the NTCA may expect taxpayers to deal more generously with the provision of tax relevant 
information. The fiscal transparency bar is higher under Horizontal Monitoring than under 
traditional monitoring.  
 
Under Horizontal Monitoring, the NTCA imposes tax assessments according to the existing 
legal framework. For that reason, the process is similar to traditional monitoring, but this is not 
the case in respect of its obligation to impose assessments as soon as possible and as much as 
possible in consultation with the taxpayer.  
 
In addition, the obligation to explain why certain information is requested does not, in our view, 
go beyond traditional tax monitoring, as it is comparable to the existing legal obligations 
(Articles 3:47 and 3:48 of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht; 
GALA). Under traditional tax monitoring, the NTCA must likewise underpin that the requested 
information might be of significance to the levying of tax of the person the information is 
requested from, and the request must be reasonably and clearly indisputable (Supreme Court 8 
January 1986, BNB 1986/128). However, the obligation to determine deadlines for providing 
the information in consultation with the taxpayer goes beyond traditional tax monitoring. Under 
the existing legal framework, the tax inspector determines the deadlines (Article 49 GTA 
1959). 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the four categories of reciprocal covenant agreements. The 
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Table 1: Overview of additional voluntary covenant obligations 
 
 Categories of covenant 
agreements  
Additional obligations for the 
taxpayer 
Additional obligations for NTCA 
1. Realisation of 
customised tax 
monitoring   
To provide a system of internal control, 
internal audit and external audit aimed 
at preparing and filing acceptable tax 
returns 
To adjust the form and intensity of the 
supervision to the quality of internal 
control, internal audit and external audit   
2. Actual tax collection To ensure timely payment of tax debts To ensure timely payment of tax 
refunds 
3. Actual insight into 
the tax position of 
taxpayer 
To submit its view, taken or to be taken, 
on relevant (fiscal) matters to the Tax 
Administration as soon as possible  
 
 
-  to issue its interpretation of the legal 
consequences as soon as possible 
after receipt of a point of view taken 
or to be taken, as much as possible in 
consultation with the taxpayer, while 
relevant periods are taken into 
account  
-  to (periodically) discuss (relevant) 
fiscal and other matters (submitted 
by the taxpayer), in particular matters 
on which a difference of opinion may 
arise from the NTCA’s point of view  
4. Update of the 
taxation process 
To promote real time working: 
-  tax returns and declarations will be 
filed as soon as possible; and 
-  any information requested by the Tax 
Administration will be provided as 
soon as possible, (generous) in full 
and unambiguously 
To promote real time working:  
-  assessments will be imposed as soon 
as possible after filing of tax returns 
and in consultation with the taxpayer 
as much as possible; and 
-  to clarify and explain why specific 
information is requested, and 
mutually agree on the response 
period 
Source: Huiskers-Stoop 2015, p. 166. 
 
The additional covenant obligations have no explicit basis in public law – although, of course, 
the NTCA has discretion with regard to its compliance strategy. Moreover, according to current 
views, the NTCA is authorised to achieve goals under public law through private law 
(Huiskers-Stoop 2015, pp. 167-169). The individual covenant can be classified as a mutual 
private agreement designed to fulfil the public task of tax collection (Article 6:261, paragraph 
1, Dutch Civil Code). Absent disputes, the legal qualification of the covenant does not seem to 
be important. It is of greater importance, however, in situations in which disputes about the 
voluntary obligations arise and cannot be resolved in an informal way. 
 
The additional covenant obligations ensure that both taxpayers and the NTCA must make more 
effort and produce more results under Horizontal Monitoring than under traditional monitoring. 
This entails that the bar is set higher under Horizontal Monitoring than under the existing legal 
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framework. We distinguish four reciprocal covenant obligations which result in the bar being 
set higher than it is in the actual legal framework (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, pp. 183-186): 
 
1) To take (when necessary) additional tax control measures and align monitoring 
(more responsiveness). 
2) The mandatory submission of (tax) relevant positions and the obligation 
to give a view on it (more transparency). 
3) The consultation obligation with regard to (tax) positions, the view on 
submitted positions, the imposition of the tax assessment and the response 
period (more interactivity).   
4) The speed at which not only additional covenant obligations but also the 
obligations arising from regular (tax) legislation must be performed (more 
speed). 
 
In principle, the covenant is concluded for an indefinite period of time. However, parties are 
free to terminate the agreement, in which case the other party will be informed of the reasons, 
in writing, in advance. Moreover, termination will not take place before oral consultation. The 
agreement may be terminated with immediate effect. 
 
4 HORIZONTAL MONITORING AND COOPERATIVE COMPLIANCE 
COMPARED 
 
This section focusses on the question of how the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model delivers 
on the principles of the OECD model of cooperative compliance. To answer this question, we 
investigate whether the Dutch model meets the six OECD principles for a cooperative 
compliance monitoring model (Section 4.1) and we will address issues of concern regarding a 
compliance-based monitoring model (Section 4.2).  
 
4.1  “Testing” the Dutch model against the OECD’s principles 
 
As described in Section 2, a cooperative compliance monitoring model can be defined as 
voluntary tax cooperation between tax authorities and large companies based on six principles: 
commercial awareness, impartiality, proportionality, openness and transparency, 
responsiveness, and supervision adjustment to TCF. In this section, we analyse how the NTCA 
has fleshed out these OECD principles into the Horizontal Monitoring model. 
 
The process of establishing a cooperative tax relationship enables the NTCA to understand the 
activities of companies eligible for Horizontal Monitoring. In addition, the principles of 
commercial awareness and openness and transparency are expressed in the principles of the 
individual covenant: parties base their relationship on mutual transparency, mutual 
understanding and trust. The process undertaken in order to enter into a Horizontal Monitoring 
relationship – especially the first three steps (the update of client profile, Horizontal Monitoring 
meeting and compliance scan) – enables the NTCA to understand the company’s business 
activities. Thus, commercial awareness enables understanding. Companies, for their part, must 
also be aware that the NTCA has to levy taxes and that deadlines are inherent to the taxation 
process. The NTCA’s commercial awareness, on the one hand, and businesses’ awareness of 
NTCA’s statutory powers, obligations, procedures and responsibilities, on the other, creates 
mutual understanding. The NTCA’s obligation to provide openness and transparency is also 
expressed in the covenant; the NTCA is obliged to discuss and respond to tax positions declared 
by taxpayers. Reciprocal understanding and transparency will fortify trustworthiness and trust. 
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The covenant also provides for the importance that the OECD attaches to obtaining fast 
certainty for the taxpayer: the NTCA must give – as soon as possible after receipt details of a 
position taken or to be taken and, as far as possible, in consultation with the taxpayer – its view 
on the legal consequences of the position and take relevant deadlines into account. Taxpayers 
should, according to the OECD, be given responses to their questions promptly, efficiently and 
professionally (OECD, 2008, p. 37). This also expresses the principle of responsiveness, 
contributing to the NTCA’s trustworthiness. 
 
The principle of proportionality concerns a balanced use of monitoring measures (OECD, 
2008, p. 35). The obligation that the NTCA must adjust the form and intensity of monitoring 
to the quality of internal and tax control provides for this. Additionally, the obligations to 
develop a qualifying TCF and for the NTCA to align its monitoring follow from the covenant. 
The taxpayer must provide a system of internal control, internal audit and external audit aimed 
at the preparation and filing of acceptable tax returns. The principle of responsiveness is also 
expressed in the alignment of supervision. 
 
With regard to the OECD’s principle of impartiality, we feel the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring 
system may fall a bit short. According to the OECD (2008), impartiality means that tax 
authorities should adopt an impartial approach in settling disputes and determining the tax debt 
(p. 35). Impartiality, or neutrality, contributes to procedural justice, taxpayers’ perceived 
fairness of procedures in the broad sense (including their treatment and the provision of 
information) which, in turn, is a major factor in establishing and maintaining trust in tax 
authorities (Kirchler, 2007, pp. 84-87). This is not only about the perceived justice of one’s 
own treatment but also of the treatment of others (see OECD, 2014, p. 24).  
 
In this regard, regulatory capture is a risk of Horizontal Monitoring, for tax inspectors may lose 
their ability to form objective opinions. Tax officials must remain impartial and maintain a 
critical attitude towards the taxpayer, and the information and tax risks that it discloses. Failure 
to maintain a professional critical attitude could have a damaging effect on overall trust in tax 
authorities (OECD, 2016, p. 28. See also Gribnau, 2015a, p. 212; Stevens Committee, 2012a, 
p. 51). Tax officials, however, also need the room to take an impartial approach of public and 
private interests in relation to those to whom they are accountable. Pressing political and 
economic demands on the tax administration may hinder such an impartial approach 
(Stebbings, 2017, pp. 222-223). In this vein, Brooks (2014) argues that, in the UK, the political 
goal, for example, of applying “not just a light touch, but a limited touch” to business regulation 
and the administration of tax puts pressure on the tax authorities to favour large businesses (p. 
175, quoting the former UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown). In contrast, politics 
may also interfere when tax authorities seem to be prompted or instructed to be tough on 
business, eroding the trustworthiness of the tax authorities.  
 
Moreover, the NTCA’s impartiality seems to be somehow endangered, because the NTCA falls 
– possibly unlike tax authorities in other countries – under the direct responsibility of the 
Finance Minister (and, in practice, the State Secretary of Finance). As a consequence, the 
NTCA has to act on the instructions from the Minister of Finance or his State Secretary. This 
could make having an impartial attitude more difficult than, for example, when the NTCA 
would have been an independent agency (the legislature is also biased towards the NTCA, 
having a (budgetary) interest in maintaining an efficient tax administration which may go at 
the expense of taxpayers’ interests, such as legal protection; see Gribnau, 2010, p. 162). With 
independent government agencies, a further political distance seems to create more room for 
an impartial approach of public and private interests. Though politically responsible for the 
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NTCA, the Minister of Finance and his State Secretary are, in principle, not allowed to interfere 
with the assessment of an individual taxpayer, since it is the tax inspector’s statutory 
competence (Article 11 GTA 1959). Nonetheless, the possibility of political interference, 
especially with regard to the Horizontal Monitoring relationship with multinational companies, 
cannot be dismissed out of hand. Integrity of government officials is, however, high on the 
political agenda. Alink and Van Kommer (2009) rightly argue that breaches of integrity 
undermine citizens’ trust in the government and may adversely impact compliance (pp. 30-35). 
With regard to political influence, the Netherlands seem to be situated somehow between, on 
the one hand. Anglo-American countries and Scandinavia, “where the public sector is most 
amenable to political control”, and, on the other, countries with “a strong state and a high 
prestige-bureaucracy, for example Germany, Japan and Spain” (Hague & Harrop, 2007, p. 367, 
referring to Hood, 1996). Moreover, there is a strong and centralised bureaucracy in the sense 
that each government department is largely autonomous (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009, p. 179). 
 
Nevertheless, Dutch tax laws and regulations – as well as “the general principles of proper 
administrative behaviour” (algemene beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur) – governing the 
NTCA’s actions provide (legal) protection to ensure that the NTCA takes an impartial attitude 
in the settlement of disputes and determination of the tax liability. The NTCA must apply the 
law objectively, even if it results in the levying of lower taxation than could have been levied 
on the basis of a subjective opinion. After all, the NTCA represents the public interest and not 
a private interest. Correctly applying the law also implies that a covenant partner is not treated 
more favourably than other taxpayers in similar circumstances. The equality of treatment is 
another aspect of the requirement of impartial application of the law. Consequently, the 
NTCA’s actions must not only have a statutory basis (by virtue of the principle of legality) but 
the exercise of its powers is also bound by unwritten legal standards, like the mentioned 
principles of proper administrative behaviour. These principles of proper administrative 
behaviour originate in case law and are further developed by the judiciary. Some of these 
principles have been codified. They offer legal protection to the citizen with regard to 
administrative bodies’ improper actions and decisions. These principles comprise procedural 
norms but also substantive norms and provide extra legal protection to taxpayers in addition to 
the protection embodied by statute law (Happé and Pauwels, 2011, pp. 247-248; Gribnau, 
2015a, pp. 205-207; Gribnau, 2007, pp. 301-308).   
 
International initiatives and regulations may also add to the NTCA’s impartiality. Moreover, 
several international initiatives have been taken to map existing national practices and identify 
good practices of efficient and effective tax administration. The European Commission has 
published various documents with regard to tax authorities' benchmarking resulting in 
increased EU scrutiny of national tax administrations (Végh & Gribnau, 2018, pp. 58-60). The 
NTCA should also act impartially by abstaining from the preferential treatment of particular 
taxpayers as part of international tax competition. There are initiatives designed to counter 
harmful tax competition among states in order to promote a level playing field. Tax authorities 
may give favourable tax rulings allowing a particular sector to operate with a lower effective 
tax rate than other sectors (see Van de Velde, 2015). The OECD and the EU, in turn, try to 
counter these harmful tax practices (OESO, 2015b; European Union, 2015).   
 
Given the analysis above, the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model meets the basic principles 
for a successful tax cooperation as formulated by the OECD; the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring 
model is also governed by concepts such as trust, mutual understanding, impartial attitude, 
proportionality, fiscal transparency and responsiveness. A striking difference is that the 
OECD’s model mainly – but not only – addresses the obligations of the tax authorities. The 
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Dutch model creates obligations of a more reciprocal nature between tax authorities and 
taxpayers. The ways in which parties act with regard to the agreements and to fulfilling their 
obligations enable reciprocal judgments of trustworthiness, which fuel both parties’ trust in the 
actual cooperative quality of their relationship. 
 
4.2  Addressing issues of concern to a compliance-based monitoring model  
 
In Chapter 3 of the 2013 report, the OECD expressed its view on issues of concern regarding 
a compliance-based monitoring model (OECD, 2013, pp. 41-57): 
  
1) the wider compliance strategy 
2) overcompliance by persuasion 
3) settlement of disputes  
4) alleged conflict with the principle of equality. 
 
We discuss below how both the OECD and the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model address 
these issues of concern. 
 
1.  The wider compliance strategy 
 
In response to the 2008 report, the OECD was criticised about the disclosure of information 
beyond what taxpayers are statutorily obliged to provide (“wider compliance”; OECD, 2008, 
p. 41. Compare Björklund Larsen, 2016, p. 37). A taxpayer’s compliance strategy should 
include all information necessary for the tax authorities to undertake a fully informed risk 
assessment. The commitment to be transparent should be reflected in a risk management 
system (OECD, 2013, p. 57). In order to create a situation of transparent tax information, the 
OECD considers it important that companies invest in qualifying TCFs. A qualifying TCF 
enables a company to report tax risks and voluntarily submit them to the tax authority (OECD, 
2013, p. 20 ; OECD, 2016). In addition, qualifying TCFs help companies to bear responsibility 
for the timely, correct and complete submission of tax returns, and the timely payment of the 
taxes due. Furthermore, TCFs give the tax authorities trust regarding the accuracy of tax 
returns. In the Dutch situation, the taxpayer’s obligations to build and use a qualifying TCF 
and the NTCA’s obligation to align supervision follow from the covenant. It also follows from 
the covenant that companies must be transparent and provide tax-relevant information liberally. 
This means that companies voluntarily provide more tax-relevant information than they are 
statutorily obliged to. 
 
2.  Overcompliance by persuasion 
 
In response to the 2008 report, the OECD received firm criticism about the allegedly 
insufficient attention paid to the interpretation of the law. Dabner and Burton (2009), for 
example, believe that when tax authorities encourage taxpayers to voluntarily settle and pay 
the right amount of tax, this is the amount of tax from the perspective of the tax authorities (pp. 
318-319). If taxpayers do not wish to accept the tax authorities’ views, they are considered to 
be noncompliant, or at least less compliant. But what should be understood as the "right" 
amount of tax? The law can be interpreted in different ways, with taxpayers and tax authorities 
having opposite interests. According to Dabner and Burton, a tax authority’s goal is to 
maximise government revenue (to our minds, however, it should be to collect the right amount 
of tax), whilst a tax professional’s/taxpayer’s goal is to minimise it. Dabner and Burton criticise 
the OECD with regard to whether there is room for differences of opinion and how possible 
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disputes about legal interpretation should be resolved. In the same vein, Freedman (2011) 
argues that the “use of persuasion to encourage compliance beyond that which might be 
required by law could result in unequal or disproportionate burdens on taxpayers who are not 
actually disobeying the law” (p. 637). 
 
It should be noted that the NTCA aims to levy the “the right amount of tax.” This aim may 
contribute to its legitimacy. Björklund Larsen (2018), for example, argues that the Swedish 
revenue collection agency has acquired legitimacy by levying and collecting “the ‘right’ – not 
the maximum – tax and minimising taxpayers errors” (p. 12). In the same vein, D’Ascenzo 
(2018) refers to the “proper and impartial administration of the tax law” (p. 248).  
 
In response to the interpretation issue, the OECD indicates when “tax planning” should be 
addressed:  
 
Planning involving a tax position that is tenable but has unintended and unexpected 
tax revenue consequences. Taking a position that is favourable to the taxpayer 
without openly disclosing that there is uncertainty whether significant matters in 
the tax return accord with the law (OECD, 2013, p.48).  
 
In the first situation, there is tax planning that, according to the OECD, does not violate the 
letter, but the spirit of the law. In passing, we note that the OECD apparently uses the term 
“letter of the law” as shorthand for tax planning that exploits the technicalities or differences 
between tax systems by making use of “a bewildering variety of techniques (e.g. multiple 
deductions of the same loss, double-dip leases, mismatch arrangements, loss-making financial 
assets artificially allocated to high-tax jurisdictions)” (Piantavigna, 2017, p. 52; see also 
Gribnau, 2015, pp. 234-236). In the second situation, there is tax planning that may be contrary 
to the letter of the law, while no openness has been given. Moreover, from a taxpayer’s 
perspective, a more neutral definition of tax planning, in the sense of taking into account the 
tax consequences of one’s actions, would make sense. It may well be argued that, given the 
complexity of the tax system, companies, like all taxpayers, have to engage in some kind of 
tax planning. They want to know the impact of taxation and tune their behaviour to account for 
this impact as they want to be in control of their finances (Gribnau, 2015, pp. 226-227).  
 
The OECD's view that companies should not only act in accordance with the letter but also in 
the spirit of the law has been firmly criticised. Freedman (2011) argues that abiding by the 
“spirit of the law” may simply mean compliance with the proper intention of the legislature as 
found by the courts by purposive construction. But that is altogether different from the spirit 
of the law as something that “may be found outside the decision of the courts, in terms of what 
is acceptable to the revenue authorities or current government, or perhaps even non-
governmental organisations” (Freedman, 2011, p. 635). The upshot would be a lack of space 
in which to disagree on the interpretation of the law by the tax authorities. Consequently, 
companies working within a cooperative compliance model would have to pay more tax than 
taxpayers not participating in cooperative compliance programmes. As shown above, 
according to critics, implementation of a cooperative compliance model would lead to “over” 
compliance (see also OECD, 2013, p. 48.) The complexity of business operations and tax laws 
is such that there is room for legitimate differences of opinion about what constitutes 
“aggressive tax planning” and which tax outcome is truly consistent with the spirit of the law 
(OECD, 2013, p. 49). If cooperative compliance does not allow for such differences of opinion 
and access to the courts to settle disputes, taxpayers entering into covenants with the tax 
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authorities are effectively agreeing to accept that, in instances of conflict, the tax authorities´ 
views prevail.  
 
In response, the OECD (2013) indicates that there must be room for taxpayers and tax 
authorities to have differences of opinion on the proper tax treatment of some transactions (p. 
50). This can be accommodated within the framework of cooperative compliance, as long as 
the taxpayer is open and transparent about its position. Essential to the relationship is, therefore, 
the disclosure of those occurrences when the taxpayer has taken a position in the tax return that 
is contrary to the view of the tax authorities. Although court proceedings could interfere with 
the mutual relationship, the OECD deems that, in practice, the number of disputes that arise in 
the context of a cooperative compliance relationship is likely to be self-limiting.  
 
A taxpayer that takes up a series of positions that conflict with the view of the revenue body, 
pursues those positions through the courts, and loses most or all of the cases, is likely to rapidly 
reassess its tax strategy. By the same token, a revenue body that frequently challenges positions 
taken by the taxpayer but is frequently unsuccessful before the courts will have to adjust its 
view of the law (OECD, 2013, p. 50).  
 
To what extent is there room for interpretation of the law in the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring 
model? In the OECD's view, tax planning should be addressed if it does not violate the letter, 
but the spirit of the law. In the OECD's view, tax planning should also be addressed when it 
may be in violation of the letter of the law, while no openness is given. The requirement that, 
in the event of possible violation of the letter or the spirit of the law, openness must be given, 
goes beyond traditional Dutch tax monitoring. In the existing legal framework, a taxpayer may 
not act in a way which is contrary to the letter of the law, but no openness has to be given in 
case of doubt. Openness must, however, be given under Horizontal Monitoring. That follows 
from the voluntarily concluded covenant. It also follows from the covenant – at least from the 
risk of termination in cases of (ongoing) aggressive tax planning – that companies should not 
structurally violate the spirit of the law (Gribnau, 2015a, pp. 213-214. See also Bronzewska, 
2016, pp. 372-374). The flexibility that companies have for tax planning under Horizontal 
Monitoring is, therefore, limited compared to the flexibility that companies which do not 
participate in HM relationships have (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, p. 441, p. 304). Tax planning in 
accordance with the spirit of the law is allowed; however, aggressive tax planning with the aim 
of paying a minimal amount of (corporate income) tax should be avoided due to the risk of the 
covenant being terminated (see, in this respect, Minister of Finance (2010, p. 3)).  
 
Thus, the covenant leaves considerable room for tax planning – even for some aggressive tax 
planning – as long as the taxpayers proactively inform the NTCA. Nonetheless, taxpayers may 
sometimes feel persuaded to comply beyond the level which they think is required by 
substantive tax law. They may perceive this as being a reasonable price to pay for a Horizontal 
Monitoring working relationship which is, overall, attractive. However, the relationship will 
be out of balance if they feel persuaded to take tax positions that they would rather not take. 
As a result, the trust base will be weakened since over-compliant taxpayers may find the NTCA 
to be less trustworthy and to lack understanding (commitment to concern and care).  
 
3.  Settlement of disputes 
 
Even when in a cooperative compliance relationship, taxpayers and tax authorities should be 
able to submit disputes to court. According to the OECD, there are two types of disputes 
(OECD, 2013, p. 51): 
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- disputes that already exist when entering into the relationship 
- disputes that arise afterwards. 
 
Entering a cooperative compliance relationship implies that existing disputes are resolved as 
far as possible. This can be done by concluding agreements (OECD, 2013, p. 52). In order to 
settle disputes that arise afterwards, the OECD explicitly points to the Dutch possibility of a 
so-called agree to disagree appeal: in a situation where there is no difference of opinion on the 
facts and only the interpretation of the law divides parties, the parties may jointly consult the 
tax court (OECD, 2013, p. 52; see also Stevens Committee, 2012a, pp. 99-100). In addition, in 
a situation of non-compliance with the additional covenant rights and obligations, parties may 
also appeal to the civil court (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, p. 441, pp. 189-192). Covenant parties 
may ask the civil court to impose fulfilment of the additional covenant obligations and, in 
exceptional cases, compensation of damage – but, of course, structural failure to comply with 
voluntary obligations probably shows that the trust base of their relationship has been seriously 
eroded.  
 
4.  Alleged conflict with the principle of equality 
  
The principle of equality entails that citizens in the same situation should be treated in the same 
way and any differences of treatment should be the rational result of objective differences in 
the circumstances of a particular case (OECD, 2013, p. 45). With regard to Horizontal 
Monitoring, the question of whether there is a conflict with the principle of equality if certain 
taxpayers are treated according to the principles of a cooperative compliance model and other 
taxpayers are not arises (cf. Björklund Larsen, 2016, pp. 38-39 and Bronzewska, 2016, pp. 375-
382). The OECD concludes that there is no conflict with the principle of equality. The common 
goal of tax cooperation based on cooperative compliance strategies is to secure the timely 
payment of the correct tax. The OECD does not think that this raises any issues in terms of 
equality before the law, as the outcome of cooperative compliance – in terms of the tax that is 
payable by a company – should be the same as that when a more traditional audit or enquiry 
approach is taken (OECD, 2013, p. 46). Regarding the other benefits offered by cooperative 
compliance, such as obtaining certainty faster or reducing tax compliance costs, the OECD 
thinks that the decision to offer cooperative compliance to taxpayers who can demonstrate they 
are of low risk is an integral part of the risk assessment process – a process that is consistent 
with the principle of equality (OECD, 2013, p. 47). According to the OECD, the existence of 
an effective TCF together with a taxpayer’s explicit willingness to meet the requirements of 
disclosure and transparency that go beyond their statutory obligations provide an objective and 
rational basis for a (procedurally) different treatment. The tax authority can place a justified 
reliance on the tax returns it receives from taxpayers who meet the requirements, and can be 
confident that material tax risks and uncertainties will be brought to its attention (OECD, 2013, 
pp. 46-47).  
 
Is there a conflict with the principle of equality in the Dutch case, as taxpayers who are willing 
and able to comply with the laws and regulations are treated procedurally differently from 
taxpayers who are not able to and/or will not comply? Horizontal Monitoring is a strategy 
aimed at deploying scarce enforcement resources as efficiently and effectively as possible, and 
is based on differentiating between non-compliant (representing a high risk) and compliant 
taxpayers (representing a low or negligible risk) as part of the NTCA’s compliance risk 
management strategy. Where two taxpayers are in identical situations in fact and legally, in 
principle they are both entitled to a covenant or not (identical cases). Insufficient trust in the 
anticipated willingness to comply voluntarily may, for the NTCA, however, be a reason to 
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enter into an agreement with one taxpayer and not with another (actual inequality) (Huiskers-
Stoop, 2015, p. 445). The actual unequal treatment can be objectively justified by the 
(informed) trustworthiness of taxpayers (Gribnau, 2015a, pp. 210-212). Again, this 
differentiated treatment should not lead to a different, more favourable outcome in terms of the 
tax payable by a taxpayer (Boer & Gribnau, 2018, pp. 232-233). Therefore, the principle of 
equality is (theoretically, at least) not violated when Horizontal Monitoring is applied (see also 
Filipczyk, 2017, pp. 333-334; Gribnau 2015a, pp. 210-212; Stevens Committee, 2012a, p. 96). 
Moreover, the principle of equality is served by the NTCA’s HM guidelines to guarantee 
uniform treatment. However, transparency is lacking in this respect, for the confidentiality 
principle (fiscal secrecy) applies to tax affairs, entailing a lack of information with regard to 
the actual execution of the NTCA’s general compliance strategy and its treatment of taxpayers 
((anonymised) court cases are, of course, an exception). This sometimes makes it difficult to 
assess the NTCA’s actual behaviour – also in the HM framework (Bronzewska, 2016, pp. 381-
382). The Stevens Committee, which evaluated developments relating to Horizontal 
Monitoring at the request of the Minister of Finance, also looked into the principle of equality. 
The Committee reported that its discussions and the information it received have not revealed 
any solid evidence to substantiate the conclusion that preferential treatment has been an issue 
(Stevens Committee, 2012a, p. 50; discussing and giving recommendations with regard to the 
“risk of regulatory capture”, a loss of a professional critical attitude). This is important, as 
media coverage sometimes suggested the existence of “sweetheart” deals, which might have 
an impact on the general public’s trust in the NTCA. It may also affect the perceived power of 
the NTCA to enforce the law and, consequently, have an impact on taxpayers’ intended tax 
compliance (Kasper, Kogler & Kirchler, 2013). In addition, state aid rules help tax authorities 
not to give away “presents” by favouring certain groups of taxpayers over others (European 
Union, 2016). When a tax measure confers certain companies with favourable tax treatment 
which improves their financial situation compared to other taxpayers who are in the same 
position and there is no justification for this, there is an issue of prohibited state aid. Preferential 
treatments would also not encourage traditional tax officials who take hierarchical and 
antagonistic approaches to change their mindsets and endorse cooperative trust relationships. 
The NTCA would be well advised to pay attention to the field of tension between professional 
ethics and trust in order to avoid regulatory capture (BMF, 2016, p. 67).  
 
The NTCA’s trust is based on positive expectations of the taxpayer’s behaviour: “a good client 
profile”. Being a “good client” assures the NTCA that it will receive current and actual 
information about the company’s tax strategy, tax control and transparency. “These are the 
elements of the NTCA’s client profile of the relevant organisation. This information enables 
the NTCA to adjust its supervision and restrict its activities solely to those required to validate 
Horizontal Monitoring” (NTCA, 2013, p. 6). To counter arbitrary treatment of taxpayers, the 
“good client profile” should be capable of being assessed objectively. In our opinion, with sub-
processes to optimise the tax control process (next to four general control objectives) and the 
details of the expectations regarding the outcome of these processes, the NTCA meets the 
requirement for more (objective) clarity to sign up to Horizontal Monitoring (Huiskers-Stoop, 
2015, p. 446; NTCA 2013, pp. 28-30; OECD 2016, p. 15; Stevens-Committee 2012a, p. 51). 
The policy to treat companies who are willing and able to comply with the tax law and 
regulations (by having their internal and tax systems up to standard and behaving responsibly 
with regard to taxation) differently from taxpayers who cannot or will not comply does not 
conflict with the principle of equality (actual inequality) (Huiskers-Stoop, 2015, p. 441; 
Stevens-Committee 2012a, p. 93, pp. 96-97). In order to be a trustworthy partner, a company 
must adopt a willing attitude towards the voluntary disclosure of tax-relevant information, 
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 5:1 2019                                          Cooperative Compliance and the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring Model 
98 
 
should not use tax aggressive or minimalistic structure (at the risk of termination the covenant), 
and must meet the requirements for a qualifying TCF (NTCA, 2013, pp. 28-32).  
 
 
5.  CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
This paper summarises how the OECD’s cooperative compliance model can be defined, how 
Horizontal Monitoring is incorporated in the Dutch legal tax system and enforcement process, 
and how the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model relates to the OECD’s view on cooperative 
compliance. The principal research question is: 
 
“How does the trust-based Horizontal Monitoring relationship and its 
establishment relate to the OECD model of cooperative compliance?”  
 
We have examined this question on the basis of three sub-questions, which we answer as 
follows. 
 
1.  How is the OECD’s cooperative compliance model defined? 
 
The OECD’s monitoring model for cooperative compliance can be defined as the voluntary tax 
cooperation between tax authorities and large companies based on six principles: commercial 
awareness, impartiality, proportionality, openness and transparency, responsiveness, and 
supervision adjustment to TCF.  
 
2.  What are the different steps to be taken in the process of concluding a Horizontal Monitoring 
covenant and how do the voluntarily accepted Horizontal Monitoring covenant obligations 
relate to the mandatory obligations laid down in the Dutch legal tax system?  
 
Taxpayers and the NTCA follow seven steps to get a Horizontal Monitoring relationship. These 
steps fit in well with two dimensions of trustworthiness: first, competence and reliability, and, 
secondly, integrity, honesty and the commitment to concern and care. These dimensions enable 
the assessment of the trustworthiness of a party which, in turn, enables the other party to place 
trust in that party. The process begins with an update of the client profile by the NTCA 
gathering information about the taxpayer and ends with adjustment of supervision. The basis 
for tax cooperation between the taxpayer and the NTCA is the individual covenant. Besides 
the general provisions on parties, duration, commencement date, evaluation and termination, 
this covenant consists of an introduction expressing the intention to achieve an effective and 
efficient mode of operation, basic principles and agreements. The principles stipulate that 
parties should base their relationship on (informed) trust, mutual understanding and 
transparency, that rights and obligations pursuant to legislation and regulations are and will 
remain applicable, and that the covenant is applicable to the levying of all Dutch national taxes 
and collection. The covenant agreements are designed with the aim of realising customised tax 
supervision, actual tax collection, actual insight into the tax position of taxpayers, and an update 
of the taxation process (real-time working), which may help to convert willingness towards 
regulatory compliance into actual compliant behaviour and ensure the taxpayer’s 
trustworthiness (NTCA, 2017, finds that enterprises with covenants are less focussed on tax 
avoidance – and are, therefore, more compliant – than enterprises without covenants).   
 
What characterises the Dutch model is the absence of an explicit statutory basis and the 
discretion of the NTCA as the basis for the Horizontal Monitoring model. The covenant 
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expresses both parties’ willingness to cooperate, and commitment to trust, mutual 
understanding and transparency. In addition, the published guidance gives the taxpayer 
certainty with regard to the behaviour of the NTCA under Horizontal Monitoring. The principle 
that rights and obligations pursuant to traditional tax monitoring remain applicable enables the 
NTCA to adjust its supervision when the taxpayer’s attitude and behaviour indicate that the 
principle of willingness to fulfil statutory obligations (voluntary compliance) is no longer 
satisfied. 
 
The covenant contains agreements which go beyond the actual statutory rights and obligations. 
These additional covenant obligations, which have a reciprocal nature, have no statutory basis 
in public law. The additional voluntary obligations entail that both taxpayers and the NTCA 
must provide more commitment and effort, and produce better results, under Horizontal 
Monitoring than under traditional monitoring.  
 
3.  How does the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model deliver on the principles of the OECD’s 
model of cooperative compliance? 
 
The Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model meets the principles for a successful tax cooperation 
as formulated by the OECD. Both the OECD and the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model 
address issues of concern about the wider compliance strategy, (forced) over-compliance by 
persuasion, the settlement of disputes, and alleged conflict with the principle of equality. In the 
Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model, it follows from the covenant that companies must be 
transparent and provide tax-relevant information liberally. In addition, the flexibility for tax 
planning under Horizontal Monitoring is more limited than under the existing legal framework. 
Tax planning in accordance with the spirit of the law is allowed; however, consistently 
aggressive or minimalistic tax planning should be avoided at the risk of termination of the 
covenant. Moreover, in a situation where there is no difference of opinion on the facts and only 
the interpretation of the law divides parties, the parties may jointly appeal to the tax court, 
starting a public law procedure (they “agree to disagree”). Furthermore, covenant parties may 
ask the civil court to impose fulfilment of the additional covenant rights and, in exceptional 
cases, compensation of damage. Finally, the policy to treat proactively transparent companies 
who are willing and able to comply with the tax law and regulations (by having their internal 
and tax systems up to standard and showing a responsible attitude towards taxation) differently 
from taxpayers who cannot or will not comply does not conflict with the principle of equality 
(actual inequality with regard to compliance). 
 
Based on the above, we give the following answer to the principal research question: 
 
A cooperative compliance model is defined as voluntary tax cooperation between 
tax authorities and large companies based on six principles: the tax authority must 
understand business activities, adopt an impartial approach, respond 
proportionally, demonstrate openness and transparency (like taxpayers 
themselves), take enterprise-specific circumstances into account, and align 
supervision to the quality of the company’s TCF. The Dutch Horizontal Monitoring 
model qualifies as a cooperative compliance model and is based on voluntary 
cooperation between the NTCA and taxpayers based on (informed) trust, mutual 
understanding and transparency, which does not, in itself, have a specific statutory 
basis but which is derived from the discretion of the NTCA to efficiently establish 
the tax enforcement process – in view of the scarce resources. The willingness to 
cooperate and the major voluntary obligations are laid down in an individual 
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covenant. The NTCA provides transparency with regard to its view on the 
Horizontal Monitoring relationship in published guidance. 
 
The research shows that the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model meets the basic principles for 
a successful tax cooperation as formulated by the OECD. The Dutch Horizontal Monitoring 
model fleshes out principles and concepts such as trust, mutual understanding, impartial 
attitude, proportionality, fiscal transparency and responsiveness. The issues of concern, as 
discussed and addressed by the OECD (Section 4.2), do not present insurmountable problems 
in the Dutch model. A striking difference between the two models is that the OECD model 
mainly – but not only – addresses the obligations of the tax authorities. The Dutch model, 
however, creates obligations between tax authorities and taxpayers of a more reciprocal nature 
(Section 4.1). The voluntary nature of the HM relationship incentivises companies to improve 
their internal tax controls facilitating trust by the NTCA. When the principles of the cooperative 
compliance model have been met, according to the OECD, the majority of taxpayers will be 
able to effectively and efficiently pay the right amount of tax in time. Taxpayers, in turn, find 
tax administrations to be trustworthy if they meet these principles, so the principles should be 
operationalised in practice to underpin this trust (Section 2.1). 
 
Concluding a covenant with the NTCA is not easy. With taxpayers showing their willingness 
and trustworthiness to comply with the tax laws and regulations voluntarily, the NTCA may 
enter into tax cooperation relationships based on trust, mutual understanding and transparency. 
In our opinion, the seven-step model offers the tax authorities sufficient guarantees to judge a 
taxpayer’s willingness to voluntarily comply with the tax laws and regulations (Section 3.2), 
to assess the trustworthiness of the taxpayer, and thus to establish and secure a trust-based 
relationship (Section 3.3) and to trust that acceptable tax returns will be filed by the company. 
As described, the NTCA’s trust is based on positive expectations of the taxpayer’s behaviour: 
a good client image. In our opinion, with various sub-processes to optimise the tax control 
process and the details of the expectations regarding the outcome of these processes, the NTCA 
meets the requirement for more (objective) clarity to join horizontal tax monitoring (Section 
3.2). The sub-processes are currently published in public policies which only bind the tax 
authorities and not the taxpayers themselves. The disadvantage is that taxpayers might see the 
published requirements as maximum requirements, which might diminish their motivation to 
optimise the tax control process.  
 
The decision of the NTCA, however, to trust a taxpayer and to conclude a covenant could be 
further substantiated by providing more clarity about the requirements for tax control (De Widt, 
2017, p. 21; Burgers & Van der Meer, 2018, p. 389). The NTCA rightly differentiates with 
regard to the trustworthiness of taxpayers, but taxpayers, of course, want to know what they 
can expect and which conditions they have to fulfil in order to qualify for a covenant. 
Additional guidance on the design of the so-called tax control framework, will enable 
companies to better assess for themselves whether they qualify for Horizontal Monitoring on 
the basis of an individual covenant or not (enabling self-selection). Given, in addition, that a 
relatively large number of covenants have already been concluded by the NTCA, resulting in 
a high demand for the NTCA’s resources, it is expected that access to the Dutch Horizontal 
Monitoring model will not be unlimited. Hence, it is also important for the NTCA itself to have 
a clear view on the level of tax control required for an individual cooperative tax relationship 
in order to draw a line between taxpayers who may opt for individual covenants and those who 
may enter into indirect covenants mediated through financial or tax law specialists.  
 
Journal of Tax Administration Vol 5:1 2019                                          Cooperative Compliance and the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring Model 
101 
 
In addition, international guidance, such as that provided by the OECD or the EU based on 
their experiences in other countries, will help tax administrations to further improve the concept 
of cooperative compliance. Compliance programmes have the common aim of increasing trust 
in the tax authorities and providing high-quality services in order to promote voluntary 
compliance (Enachescu & Kirchler, 2018). However, public perceptions of compliance 
strategies of tax administrations should not be underestimated. The Horizontal Monitoring 
model and its goals should therefore be properly explained and understood by citizens; the 
focus on reciprocal cooperation and mutual trust, understanding and transparency could 
otherwise be misperceived. Misinformed citizens might associate Horizontal Monitoring with 
corruption and sweetheart deals between taxpayers and the NTCA. This would eventually 
erode trust in the tax authorities.  
 
In conclusion, a voluntary cooperative tax relationship on the basis of trust, mutual 
understanding and transparency not only offers benefits for the tax authorities, enhancing the 
payment of the right amount of tax at the right time, but also offers benefits for particularly 
large companies, leading to them having greater certainty about their tax positions and 
maintaining better relationships with the tax authorities. Nevertheless, in the light of changing 
views on tax planning, mandatory disclosure, international information exchange, tax 
compliance and impartial enforcement, permanent reflection is required for the further 
improvement of both the Dutch Horizontal Monitoring model and the general concept of 
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APPENDIX: INDIVIDUAL COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT (COVENANT) 
 
Parties 
This Agreement is concluded between: 
•  [COMPANY], established in …… [address], represented by ……[name] 
And the Netherlands Tax and Customs Administration (referred to as the Tax Administration),  
represented by 
•  ……….[name, position, Tax Administration] 
 
This agreement also applies to entities which are controlled by [COMPANY]. Parties have 
mutually agreed on the entities concerned. Together they will be referred to as [X]. 
 
Introduction 
Parties want to achieve an effective and efficient mode of operation. They aim for permanent 
actual insight into relevant events and fast decisions in order to increase legal certainty. The 
basic principles and the desired form of cooperation are laid down in this agreement. 
 
The original Agreement is in the Dutch language and the Dutch text shall prevail. 
 
1. Basic principles 
 
• Parties base their relationship on trust, understanding and transparency. 
• Rights and obligations pursuant to legislation and regulations are and will remain 
applicable without limitation. 
• This Agreement is applicable to levying of all [X]’s Dutch National Taxes1 and collection. 
 
¹ Where appropriate this may include the application of the VAT Compensation Fund. 
 
2. Agreements between [X] and the Tax Administration 
 
[X]: 
• Provides a system of internal control, internal audit and external audit aimed at preparing 
and filing acceptable tax returns²; 
• Ensures timely payment of tax debts; 
• Submits its view, taken or to be taken, on relevant (tax) matters to the Tax Administration 
as soon as possible. This applies to matters on which a difference of opinion may arise with 
the Tax Administration, for instance on a different interpretation of facts or matters of law. 
[X] actively provides the Tax Administration insight into all facts and circumstances, its 
views and its interpretation of the relevant legal consequences thereof; 
• Promotes real time processing. Tax returns and declarations will be filed as soon as 
possible after the end of the tax period. Any information requested by the Tax 
Administration will be provided as soon as possible, in full and without ambiguity. 
 
² An acceptable tax return conforms to legislation and regulations and contains no 
material misstatements. 
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The Tax Administration: 
• Adjusts the form and intensity of its supervision to the quality of internal control, internal 
audit and external audit;  
• Ensures timely payment of tax refunds; 
• Issues its interpretation of the legal consequences as soon as possible after receipt of a point 
of view taken or to be taken, as much as possible in consultation with [X]; 
• Takes the relevant periods into account when giving its interpretation of the legal 
consequences; 
• Discusses (relevant) fiscal and other matters with [X]; in particular matters on which a 
difference of opinion may arise from the Tax Administration´s point of view;   
• Will clarify and explain why specific information is requested from [X], and mutually 
agree on the response periods; 
• Promotes real time processing. Assessments will be imposed as soon as possible after filing 
of tax returns and in consultation with [X] as much as possible. 
 
Parties have found solutions for or agreed on issues relating to fiscal and other relevant matters 
from the past presently known to [X] and/or the Tax Administration in accordance with 
legislation and regulations, or have agreed on procedural arrangements. 
 
3. Duration, regular evaluation and termination 
 
This Agreement is made for an indefinite period of time. The Agreement will be evaluated 
periodically by [X] and the Tax Administration. If one of the parties wishes to terminate this 
Agreement, the other party will be informed in writing in advance of the reasons. Moreover, 
termination will not take place before oral consultation, this Agreement may be terminated 
with immediate effect. 
 
4. Commencement date 
 
This Agreement commences when both parties have signed. 
 
On behalf of [COMPANY]    On behalf of the Tax Administration 
 
 
(Name)       (Name) 
(Position)       (Position) 
(Date)       (Date) 
 
 
